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A CRITICAL LEGAL RHETORIC APPROACH TO
IN RE AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE

DESCENDANTS LITIGATION
LOLITA BUCKNER INNISS*
INTRODUCTION

Critical legal rhetoric is a means of explicating the way in which rhetoric
and ideology relate to law. It names the rhetorical practices and clarifies
the ideologies that go into making up the law's articulations. Critical legal
rhetoric is, in other words, a way of understanding not only why law
performs its work, but how. Critical legal rhetoric is an analytical approach
that concerns itself with both the structural and material aspects of a text in
order to trace the recurring forms that inhabit both the legal and the public
sphere.' The chief methodological framework for performing critical legal
rhetorical analysis comes from the work of Marouf Hasian, Jr., particularly
his schema for analysis, which he calls "substantive units" in critical legal
rhetoric. 2 Critical legal rhetoric is a potent tool for exposing the way in
which the public ideologies of society and the private ideologies of jurists,
legislators and other legal actors are manifested in legal and law-like
pronouncements. 3
* Professor, Cleveland Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University, A.B. Princeton
University, J.D. University of California, Los Angeles, LLM Osgoode Hall, York Law School,
University, PhD Candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. This article is adapted in part
from a thesis submitted to the York University Faculty of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Law. The author thanks Professors Obiora Okafor and Sonia
Lawrence of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Professor Anthony Farley of Boston College
Law School, Professor Toni Williams of the University of Kent Law School, and Professors Mark
Sundahl and Brian Ray of Cleveland Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University for reading
earlier drafts of this article.
I MAROUF HASIAN, JR., LEGAL MEMORIES AND AMNESIAS IN AMERICA'S RHETORICAL CULTURE
14 (Westview Press 2000) ("Because critical rhetoricians are concerned with both the structural and
material dimensions of both textual and visual material, they try to find perspectives that allow them to
trace the recurring forms that circulate in both the legal and public spheres.").
2 Id. (explaining that Hasian's substantive units of analysis "sometimes involve macroanalysis,
such as Michel Foucault's discussions of epistemes, or they can involve microanalysis, where
researchers look at syntax or the semantic meanings of a particular term").
3 See Alan E. Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law, 48 INT'L &
COMP. L. Q. 901, 901-02 (1999) (discussing what constitutes law and finding that soft law, unlike hard
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In this article I apply critical legal rhetoric to the judicial opinion
rendered in response to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Second Amended and Consolidated Complaint in In Re African-American
Slave Descendants.4 This case concerned the efforts of a group of modernday descendants of enslaved African-Americans to obtain redress for the
harms that slavery caused not only to their ancestors, but also to
themselves. 5 While it does not concern well-known litigants or high profile
issues, and therefore figured little in the broader public consciousness, the
case is important because it documents the dramatic struggles of blacks for
racial inclusion, which are emblematic of the wider American effort to craft
an inclusive liberal culture of citizenship. 6 As such, it lends itself especially
well to a critical legal rhetorical analysis. Because the focus of this article
is a particular methodological approach to legal rhetorical analysis, I do not
address the substantive legal nature of reparations claims more broadly, as
has been done in some other recent articles. 7 Instead, I use reparations and
slavery as the context for illustrating critical legal rhetoric. after
law, lacks the power to bind, despite offering normative guidance); see also Anna Di Robilant,
Genealogies of Soft Law, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 499, 499 (2006) (expounding on the soft vs. hard law
debate and discussing the "relatively recent blossoming of multiple soft law tools and the calls for a soft
harmonization of European private law[s] [that] have invited reflection on the genealogy of soft law.").
4 In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp 2d. 721, 726 (N.D. Ill. 2005)
(discussing plaintiff's complaint, which "asks the courts to reexamine a tragic period in our Nation's
history [slavery] and to hold various corporate defendants liable for the commercial activities of their
alleged predecessors before, during, and after the Civil War in America").
5 This case concerns what one scholar has called a "historical injustice," a matter belonging to a
class of wrongs that share key characteristics: "(a) they were committed or sanctioned at least a
generation ago; (b) they were committed or authorized by one or more collective agents, such as a
government or corporation; (c) they harmed many individuals; and (d) they involved violations of
fundamental human rights, often discrimination based on race, religion, or ethnicity." Shelley
Buchanan, Questioning the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine: Inconsistent Applications in Reparations and
Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation, 17 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 345, 361 (2009), citing Katrina
Miriam Wyman, Is There a Moral Justificationfor Redressing HistoricalInjustices? 61 VAND. L. REV.
127, 134 (2008).
6 See MARK S. WEINER, BLACK TRIALS: CITIZENSHIP FROM THE BEGINNINGS OF SLAVERY TO THE
END OF CASTE xii (Vintage Books 2004) (discussing various "legal cases that allow us to peer into a

history of resistance to principles of racial exclusion, that for centuries, were central to American
conceptions of national identify" and how "[t]he struggle of Afro-Americans for individual and social
justice forcefully challenged those principles and helped to fashion a more inclusive, liberal culture of
citizenship in our country.").
7 See e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto, Kim, American Reparations Theory and Practiceat the Crossroads,
44 CAL. W. L. REV. 1,15-39 (2007); Tara Kolar Ramchandani, Judicial Recognition of the Harms of
Slavery: Consumer Fraud as an Alternative to Reparations Litigation, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV.
541(2007); Eric K. Yamamoto, Kim et al., American Racial Justice on Trial--Again: African American
Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1295-1310 (2003);
Robert Westley, Bridging the Public/PrivateLaw Divide in African-American Reparations Discourse,
55 RUTGERS L. REV. 301 (2003).
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introducing the African-American Slave Descendants case, I explain the
genealogy of critical legal rhetoric as a prelude to a discussion and
application of the methodology. I briefly trace the evolution and meaning
of the term 'rhetoric' and examine the relationship between rhetoric and
law. I then explore the connection between rhetoric and ideology, which is
crystallized in the form of the ideograph and its use as a tool of what is
known as critical rhetoric. Finally, I show how critical legal rhetoric is
achieved by bringing critical rhetoric to law, and thereafter apply critical
legal rhetoric to the case of In Re African-American Slave Descendants.
I. THE CASE OF IN RE AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS

A. The Facts
The case began in 2002, when nine lawsuits were filed around the
country against various American corporations. On October 25, 2002, the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred these actions for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1407. The suits were consolidated in federal court in the Northern District
of Illinois, where the plaintiffs filed a First Consolidated and Amended
Complaint on June 16, 2003.
a. The Plaintiffs
The plaintiffs in these cases included the following: Deadria FarmerPaellmann 8 (who has often served as the leader and spokesperson for the
class of plaintiffs), Mary Lacey Madison, Andre Carrington, Richard
Barber, Sr., Hannah Jane Hurdle-Toomey, Marcelle Besteda Porter, Julie
Mae Wyatt-Kervin, Emma Marie Clark, Ina Bell Daniels Hurdle McGee,
Antoinette Harrell Miller, as well as a group of anonymous plaintiffs, many
8 Deadria Farner-Paellmann's story of how she became involved in the suit is compelling. Having
developed an interest in the notion of reparations generally, she first considered the possibility of suing
the federal government for its role in creating and maintaining slavery. When her research suggested
that this would be difficult given the failure of other such suits, she turned instead to researching the
role of private entities. She attended law school to further her research and gain the skills necessary to
prosecute such a suit. In the course of her work, she uncovered evidence that Aetna Insurance had
insured the lives of slaves for the benefit of their owners and thereby profited from slavery. She also
determined that predecessors to one financial services institution, JP Morgan Chase, had "accepted
approximately 13,000 enslaved individuals as collateral on loans and took possession of approximately
1,250 enslaved individuals." Nick Mathiason, British Firms Could Be Sued for Slave Trade, THE
OBSERVER, July 1, 2007, at 3. Her work led to Aetna's offer of a public apology for its involvement in
slavery. Ms. Paellmann's discovery also led the state of California and other state and municipal
jurisdictions to compel other companies to search their records for involvement in slavery and to make
this information available to the public. Jason Levy, Slavery Disclosure Laws: For Financial
Reparations orfor "Telling the Truth? ", 2009 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 468, 472-473 (2009).
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of whom, it was alleged, had been held as slaves well after the period on
legal slavery ended in the United States. The plaintiffs filed on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, thus including in the plaintiff class
all of the descendants of African-ancestored persons who had been
enslaved in the United States.
b. The Defendants
The following companies were defendants: FleetBoston Financial
Corporation, CSX Corporation, Aetna Inc., Brown Brothers Harriman,
New York Life Insurance Company, Norfolk Southern Corporation,
Lehman Brothers, Lloyd's of London, Union Pacific Railroad, JP Morgan
Chase Manhattan Bank, Westpoint Stevens Inc., RJ Reynolds Tobacco
Company, Brown and Williamson, Liggett Group Inc., Loews Corporation,
Canadian National Railway, Southern Mutual Insurance Company, and
American International Group ("AIG"). On January 26, 2004, United
States District Court Judge Norgle granted a joint motion to Dismiss filed
by all defendants in response to the First Amended and Consolidated
Complaint, while giving leave for the plaintiffs to re-file their claims. On
April 5, 2004 the plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Consolidated
Complaint on behalf of themselves and a plaintiff class consisting of the
same plaintiffs.9 It is the judicial opinion disposing of this Second
Amended Consolidated Complaint that is the focus of this article.
B. The Gravamen of the Complaint
The crux of the complaints filed in this action was that various American
corporations such as CSX, Aetna, and Fleet Bank had profited from slavery
by either insuring slaves, lending to owners, or, in some cases, even
owning slaves, and that those who descended from slaves have various
civil claims arising from this corporate involvement in slavery. The claims
asserted by the plaintiffs were conspiracy, conversion, unjust enrichment,
replevin, violation of Title 42, § 1982 (guaranteeing property rights of all
citizens), intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and several counts alleging violation of state-based
Unfair Deceptive Acts and Practices (UDAP) in the jurisdictions where the
cases were initially filed (New York, Texas, California, Illinois, Louisiana
9 Amended Complaint at 5, Farmer-Paellmann v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2004)
(stating that plaintiffs are filing on behalf of themselves, their enslaved ancestors, and all other persons
similarly situated alleging nine separate complaints of various unjust enrichment and human rights
violations regarding the trans-Atlantic slave trade).
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and New Jersey.) The relief requested included an accounting of profits,
disgorgement of profits, creation of an "independent historical
Commission" to study defendants' actions, a constructive trust, restitution,
and compensatory and punitive damages arising out of the named
defendants' alleged past and continued wrongful conduct relating to the
institution of slavery. On July 6, 2005, Judge Norgle dismissed the Second
Amended Consolidated Complaint once more in response to defendants'
joint motion to dismiss. This dismissal was with prejudice.10
C. The Dismissal

Judge Norgle asserted four bases for dismissal:
1) lack of standing;

2) failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted;
3) debarment of the suit under the political question doctrine;
4) debarment of the suit under relevant statutes of limitations;
In reaching his decision on dismissal, Judge Norgle went well beyond
the legal precedents and addressed the social and political history of
slavery. He also attempted to formulate a definition of reparations by
considering the political, moral and legal justifications for slave
reparations. Norgle left for last the legal grounds for his decision. This
conclusion suggests that there is a clear delineation between the legal, the
political, and the moral.
D. Why this Case?
The case of Slave Descendants is novel in many respects. It involves

nine individual plaintiffs who have sued several corporations for damages
because those corporations allegedly profited from the system of chattel
slavery imposed on African-Americans in the United States. Although
10 See Slave Descendants, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 781 (dismissing plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice
and holding "Plaintiff's attempt to bring these claims more than a century after the end of the Civil War
and the formal abolition of slavery fails"); see also In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 471
F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that on December 13, 2006, the panel, consisting of Seventh Circuit
Judges Easterbrook, Posner and Manion upheld, at the pleading stage, the consumer protection claim
predicated on the defendants' failure to disclose to consumers their past involvement in slavery;
however, Posner stated, "This claim has nothing to do with ancient violations and indeed would be
unaffected if the defendants' dealings with slaveowners had been entirely legal. It is a complaint of
consumers being deceived because sellers have concealed a material fact. The injury is the loss incurred
by buying something that one wouldn't have bought had one known the truth about the product."); see
also Jeff Coen, New Day in Courtfor Reparations: Plaintiffs Appeal Ruling in Suit Seeking Pay for
Slaves' Descendants, CtI. TRIB., Sept. 28, 2006 (discussing plaintiffs' argument before the Seventh
Circuit of the United States Federal Court of Appeals that the suit should be reinstated and allowed to
proceed to trial).
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there is an already significant and constantly growing body of cases on the
general topic of African-American reparations and other efforts at seeking
compensation for slavery," the claims in African-American Slave
Descendants is unique in its particular approach to redress AfricanAmerican slavery. The plaintiffs argued novel causes of action and
targeted entirely private nongovernmental entities as defendants. However,
beyond its potential impact on the plaintiffs and the defendants, the case
may be viewed as a localized narrative of the relationship between the
black actor, the state and the polity. Hence, the opinion rendered in the
Motion to Dismiss in the case of African-American Slave Descendants
Litigation'2 is an ideal vehicle for illustrating critical legal rhetoric because
it combines a number of elements that highlight an ongoing but frequently
little remarked concern of African-ancestored people in the United States:
the effort to receive reparations for their enslavement. Had the case
proceeded to a full trial, and had the plaintiffs won, the case had the
potential to reverse hundreds of years of assertions about the responsibility
of public and private actors who helped to sustain chattel slavery in the
United States. Though the case was dispensed with in pretrial proceedings,
the case is arguably what one observer has called a classic "legal symbol:"
it transcends its own context, and its meaning both depends upon and
influences group assumptions about race, slavery and law in the United
States. 13
11 See generally Obadele v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 432, 433 (2002) (stating that Plaintiffs
sought compensation from the United States to redress wrongs that their ancestors suffered as a result of
being African-American); Bell v. United States, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14812 (N.D. Texas 2001) at *2
(explaining that petitioners are bringing their suit as a special damage claim for slavery reparation);
Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1103 (9th Cir. 1995) (listing the elements of plaintiffs claim
arising out of wrongdoings from slavery); Berry v. United States, 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9665 (N.D. Cal.
1994) at *9 (discussing plaintiff's claim for compensation from wrongs from slavery); Johnson v.
McAdoo, 45 U.S. App. D.C. 440 (1916) (seeking to sue the United States over the rate charged for the
exportation of sugar). But see Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D 82 (1999) (describing black farmers'
claims of redress for the federal government's failure to fund farm loans as it pledged to do, which
resulted in a capitulation by the government and a settlement on behalf of black farmers whose plight in
many ways resulted from slavery and Jim Crow; however, the merits of the case did not rely upon
injuries from slavery, but rather from the government's actions dating from the late twentieth century:
the judge who approved the settlement suggested the slavery connection in his opinion, referencing
"Forty Acres and a Mule" and the government's broken promises to blacks, but noted that the specific
promises in dispute came well after the period of slavery; Roy L. Brooks, The Slave Redress Cases, 27
N.C. CENT. L.J. 130, 162-66 (2005) (providing a discussion of Pigford v. Glickman). For a broad
discussion of the various theories employed in reparations cases see Eric K. Yamamoto, Kim, American
ReparationsTheory and Practiceat the Crossroads,44 CAL. W. L. REV. 1,15-39 (2007).
12 In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F.Supp. 2d 721 (N.D. II1.2005).
13 See Robert L. Tsai, Sacred Visions of Law, 90 IOwA L. REv. 1095, 1112 (2005) (defining a case
that appears in symbolic form as one that, among other things, "is recycled for an associated saying or
quotation that transcends its original context"); In this respect, Slave Descendants may also be
classified as what Weiner calls a "black trial": "[a] legal event[] that figure[s] symbolically and
dramatically in American culture by making public certain basic ideological conflicts about race and
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I go next to a brief discussion of rhetoric.
II. The Meaning of Rhetoric

At the heart of critical legal rhetoric is rhetoric itself. By rhetoric, I refer
to that branch of literary theory that concerns itself with how language
operates, especially how it operates in argument. Though the term rhetoric
is quite frequently employed in the pejorative sense of putting forward
meaningless, intellectually

void discourse

for the

sole purpose

of

persuading others to embrace a point of view, the reach of rhetoric is well
beyond this jaundiced view.

Rhetoric may be traced from its classical

antecedents all the way to its modem incarnation as a significant tool in
expressions of law such as the judicial opinion.
Rhetoric, one of the three original liberal arts in ancient Greece, has a
long and distinguished pedigree. Although in earliest times the focus of
rhetoric was oral communication, over the centuries rhetoric has come to
encompass written communication as well.

Rhetoric, as opposed to

dialectical or logical approaches, was the province of civic discourse, law,
and politics.

Aristotle, in the Art of Rhetoric, indicates that while both

rhetoric and dialectic are epistemological devices and, hence, utilized for
truth seeking, the realm of rhetoric is ultimately the deliberative or the
adjudicatory.14 Even well before Aristotle, rhetoric was firmly established

as a communicative technique for shaping pubic knowledge and public
culture. Consider, for example, references to the use of rhetoric in the work
of Homer. 15
In the continuing journey to understand the nature of legal
civic life." MARK S.WEINER, supra note 6, at xi. Weiner describes black trials as not strictly limited
to the conduct of legal proceedings that could be termed as "trials" wherein there is examination before
a judicial tribunal of the facts at issue in a cause, but other sorts of proceedings performed by or
sanctioned by law that involve the rights of blacks such as grand jury investigations, hangings and
televised hearings. id.; see generally William Lewis & John Louis Lucaites, Race Trials: The Rhetoric
of Victimage and the Racial Consciousness of 1930s America, in ARGUMENT INA TIME OF CHANGE:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE ON ARGUMENTATION 269-74 (James F. Klumpp
ed., 1998) (introducing a discussion on two trials which demonstrate the enabling and restriction of
racial discourses in America).
14 ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIvIC DISCOURSE 335 (George A. Kennedy trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1991).
15 EDWARD P. J CORBETT & ROBERT J. CONNORS, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN
STUDENT 10 (Oxford University Press 1999). To illustrate the meaning of rhetoric, the authors quote
Odysseus's speech in Book 9 of the Iliad wherein Odysseus persuades Achilles to continue fighting.
The authors write: "Today we find it almost laughable to read about warriors pausing in the heat of
battle, as they do in some of the scenes of the Iliad, to hurl long speeches at one another. But the
tradition of oratory was already well established--if not yet well formulated---in Homer's time, and this
tradition persisted and grew stronger throughout the Golden Age of Athens. So we must take the oratory
displayed in this scene as seriously as the participants took it, and we must savor the relish with which
they indulged in this battle of words." Id. at 10.
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pronouncements, modem commentators have taken up the baton of rhetoric
and law, particularly as it concerns the judicial opinion. Although I rely
chiefly upon the work of Marouf Hasian in framing my discussion, there
are a number of other contemporary scholars who have examined the
import, complexity, and richness of the law's rhetoric. Among them are
John Louis Lucaites16 William Lewis,' 7 Francis J. Ranney, 18 James B.
White, 19 Gerald Wetlaufer, 20 Robert Ferguson, 21 Kurt Saunders, 22 Richard
M. Weaver, 23 Chaim Perelman, 24 and Frederic Gale.2 5
An example of the writing in this area is the work of Fredric Gale. In
PoliticalLiteracy: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Possibility of Justice, Gale
considers the discourse of legal jurisprudence as manifested in court
decisions and other similar types of legal interpretation. 26 Though Gale's
focus is clearly rhetorical, he positions himself outside Aristotle's
understanding of rhetoric as chiefly the situs of legal persuasion. 27 Gale's
16 See generally John Louis Lucaites & William E. Wiethoff, Rhetoric and Law, 60 S. COMM. J. 1
(1994) (examining the relationship between rhetoric and the law); John Louis Lucaites, Between
Rhetoric and the Law, 76 Q. J. SPEECH 435 (1990) (reviewing Lucaites' characterization of the
relationship between rhetoric and the law).
17 See generally William Lewis, Law's Tragedy, 21 RHETORIC Soc'Y Q. 3, 11 (1991) (elaborating
on the criticisms of James Boyd White's characterization of the relationship between law and rhetoric).
18 See generally FRANCES J. RANNEY, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS AND LEGAL RHETORIC: AN ANALYSIS
OF LANGUAGE BELIEFS AND THE LAW (2005) (examining the troubled relationship between rhetoric
and law).
19 See generally James B. White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and
Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1985) (suggesting that law is not a system of rules, but a
branch of rhetoric).
20 Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse,76 VA. L. REV. 1545 (1990)
(reflecting on the discipline-specific rhetoric of law and using literary criticism as a method to identify
ways in which the law provides its own particular kinds of statement).
21 Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE JL. & HUMAN. 201
(1990).
22 Kurt Saunders, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Argument, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 566 (1994)
(exploring the relationship between rhetoric and legal argument).
23 RICHARD M. WEAVER, THE ETHICS OF RHETORIC (Hermagoras Press 1985) (1953) (providing a
critique of the ethical and cultural role of rhetoric).
24 GUY HAARSCHER, ET. AL, JUSTICE ET ARGUMENTATION: ESSAIS A LA MEMOIRE DE CHAIM
PERELMAN (Brussels, Belgium: Editions de l'Universit& de Bruxelles 1986); CHAIM PERELMAN, AN
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL THINKING (Random House 1965); CHAIM PERELMAN,
JUSTICE, LAW, AND ARGUMENT: ESSAYS ON MORAL AND LEGAL REASONING (D. Reidel 1980); CHAIM
PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.
1963); CHAIM PERELMAN, THE NEW RHETORIC AND THE HUMANITIES: ESSAYS ON RHETORIC AND ITS
APPLICATIONS (D. Reidel 1979); CHAIM PERELMAN & RAY D. DEARIN, THE NEW RHETORIC OF CHAIM
PERELMAN: STATEMENT & RESPONSE (Univ. Press of Am. 1989); CHAIM PERELMAN, THE REALM OF

RHETORIC (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1982).
25

FREDRIC G. GALE, POLITICAL LITERACY: RHETORIC, IDEOLOGY, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF

JUSTICE (State Univ. of New York Press 1994).
26 Id. at 2 (explaining that Gale's examination of legal rhetoric focuses on "the rhetoric of
justification, that is, the discourse that purports to explain the rules by which opinions become laws").
27 It is important to note here that much of contemporary United States scholarship on Artistotle's
Rhetoric has been characterized by divergent opinions. There has been what one scholar has described
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concern "is not about the way lawyers and judges use language to
persuade." 2 8 Rather, he notes that his work "is one step more abstract,
being concerned with the rhetoric of justification, that is, the discourse that
purports to explain the rules by which opinions become laws." 29 Gale
describes his principal concern as the "rhetoric of justification" in the
appellate decision. 30
Gale's articulation of these concerns recalls Aristotle's view of rhetoric:
judges select jurisprudential theories that best reflect the arguments upon
which they rely. Hence, for Gale, jurisprudential theories are not so much
legal epistemological devices for predicting or explaining future judicial
acts, as they are post hoc explicatory tools for past judicial decisions.
Attributing the force of unvarnished authority and unassailable integrity to
judicial opinions "conceals the political and ideological purposes of the
discourse behind a veil of language intended to provide a transcendent,
predictable theory of jurisprudence but which in fact fails to do so." 3 1
The long connection between rhetoric and law has meant that this
connection strikes many as more apparent than it, in fact, is.32 Indeed, in
recent years, a number of authors have identified and expounded upon the
law as rhetoric. 33 However, perhaps the facile identification between
rhetoric and law takes too much for granted. Notwithstanding the easy
identification between law and rhetoric in the classical rhetorical
tradition, there are clear distinctions between law and rhetoric.
Law is inherently a social endeavor that is enforced by political
authority. Law, though often unitary in its ideal, is multifunctional in
attaining its ideal. Law consists of rules or norms of conduct that mandate,
proscribe or permit specified relationships among people and organizations,
articulate methods to ensure the impartial treatment of such people, and
prescribe punishments for those who do not follow the established rules of
conduct. At the same time, there often is a certain self-reflexiveness to law
wherein law is itself an agent for enforcing its own rules. One chief claim
as "sustained and sharp controversy" surrounding the meaning and importance of the work. Michael
Leff, The Uses of Aristotle's Rhetoric in Contemporary American Scholarship, 7 ARGUMENTATION
313, 313 (2004).
28 See Gale, supra note 25, at 2.
29 Id.

30 Id.
GALE, supra note 22, at 3.
32 White, supra note 19, at 684 (suggesting that "law is most usefully seen not, as it usually is by
academics and philosophers, as a system of rules, but as a branch of rhetoric").
33 Jerry Frug, Argument as Character, 40 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871-74 (1988) (rejecting
Enlightenment "reason" as a foundation for law in favor of rhetorical argumentation and, ultimately, the
character that alone makes it succeed).
31
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that formal law makes is its relative certainty, rigidity, and fixedness in a
world wherein many other things change easily.
In contrast, rhetoric is the use of language to persuade, and it just as
often serves as a mere instrument as it does an actual source of meaning.
Rhetoric is highly situationally contingent and operates in the realm of
uncertainty and probability. 34 According to Francis Ranney, rhetoric is "a
perspective on language that is conscious of itself as such." 35 For Ranney,
this means that while rhetoric is, at its core, concerned with the use of
language, it is not synonymous with language; rhetoric is the conscious,
thoughtful use of language in a symbolic manner. However, rhetoric is,
like law, ultimately epistemic in nature; it brings a knowledge system to
particularized contexts. 36 Despite this similarity, to view the identity
between rhetoric and law lightly is to potentially misunderstand the
relation, for the connections between law and rhetoric are "more esoteric
than self-evident." 37 One reason for this may be that classical rhetoric
requires the understanding of a fundamental division between what is
communicated through language and how it is communicated.
A. The JudicialOpinion as an Exercise in Rhetoric
Reading a judicial opinion as a rhetorical writing necessarily entails
bringing aspects outside of the text to the opinion, such as the historical
context by which it is framed and the biography of the author or other
actors. Such a reading necessarily requires viewing the text on a plane
wherein relevant features within and without the text are taken into
account. This is especially true given the casuistry that exemplifies the
judicial decision-making process, in particular the doctrine of stare decisis.
Because the subject matter at the heart of the African American Slave
Descendants case is slavery, this raises a host of moral and ethical
dilemmas. 38 A failure to take into account the atmosphere outside of the
text threatens to render the text little more than a pallid, legalistic account,
34 EDWARD P. J. CORBETr, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT 7 (Oxford Univ.

Press 1965) (discussing that rhetoric is used to persuade another about the course of the future, which is
inherently uncertain and focuses on probability).
35 FRANCES J. RANNEY, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS AND LEGAL RHETORIC: AN ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE
BELIEFS AND THE LAW 1 I (Ashgate Publ'g Co. 2005).
36 See generally WILLIAM A COviNO & DAVID A JOLLIFFE, RHETORIC: CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS,

BOUNDARIES (Allyn & Bacon, 1995) ("[R]hetoric is not a content area that contains a definite body of
knowledge, like physics; instead, rhetoric might be understood as the study and practice of shaping
content.").
37 GuYoRA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW 292 (Princeton Univ.

Press 2000).
38 See e.g. the discussion of slavery as an ideograph infra at Sec. V. A..

2010]

!NREAFRICAN-AMERICANSLAVEDESCENDANTSLITIGATION

659

which obscures the very vivid reality underneath.
Given the reliance on previous legal authority requisite in the enterprise
of citing precedent to support an outcome, all such judicial decisions
become subject to the charge of being logically fallacious. This is because
such decisions argue from authorities whose veracity or accuracy is
unproven. Moreover, even assuming that the appeal to authority found in
judicial opinions is a sound basis for obtaining relevant propositional
knowledge, it is always possible for a jurist to evade precedent by making
inapt comparisons between cases, whether intentional or not. This of
course presents the familiar problem of comparing apples to oranges, or
worse yet, apples to car engines, when making appraisals. However,
concern with what counts as a functional analogue for arguments based on
precedent differs somewhat from the more general problem of arguing by
analogy, for arguments based on precedent ultimately rely upon not just
"the pure science" ideal of achieving congruence between situations but
also upon principles of fairness and consistency. 39 Because discussions of
this type often implicate values and ideals that go beyond the individual
interests at stake, reasoning may be all the more subject to being clouded
40
by a desire, whether implicit or explicit, to achieve a particular outcome.
Typically, the only way to challenge an error occurring in a court
judgment is via the appellate process. Because there might be practical
reasons that prevent litigants from making such an appeal-expense, lack
of time, or already having reached a court of last resort--evasions of
precedent may not only go unchallenged, but become entombed in the
system of precedent for later reference themselves. 4 1 All of this is not to
gainsay the value of casuistic or moral pragmatic approaches to judicial
decision-making or to urge some sort of iconoclastic heterodoxy that
reforms or replaces the genre of the judicial opinion. Rather, reading
judicial opinions as exercises in rhetoric broadens our understanding of the
law as a means of expressing ideology.

39 CHRISTOPHER TINDALE, FALLACIES AND ARGUMENT APPRAISAL 205 (Cambridge Univ. Press
2007) ("[N]otice that the reasoning here, unlike that in basic analogical arguments, involves an appeal
to an underlying principle of consistency or fairness."); see generally PETER BURKE, HISTORY AND
SOCIAL THEORY 25-27 (Cornell Univ. Press 2005) (describing problems of creating fair analogies due
to significant differences in traits as well as one's own bias as to what the standard should be).
40 See TINDALE, supra note 39, at 205 (stating that close associations may cause people to
disregard facts detrimental to their argument).

41

See JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW 5 (Yale Univ.

Press 1978) (explaining that standing is another hurdle that may prevent litigation from being pursued
further).
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B. The Rhetoric,Ideology and Law Continuum
The dichotomy between content and form in rhetoric - between what is
stated and how it is stated - was described by Aristotle as logos and lexis. 42
This distinction, though foundational in early understandings of rhetoric,
tends to understate the connectedness of ideas themselves and the language
used to express them. This connectedness implicates not just law and
rhetoric, but a connection between ideology and rhetoric as well. To fully
explicate this connection, I explore the development of some the multiple
strands and purposes of ideology, such as the conceptual, doctrinal,
epistemological, and sociological strands. I then reach the notion of law as
an ideological creation from which grows the critical rhetoric approach.
a. The Origins of Ideology
Ideology as a concept in social thought has had a long and complex
development, and, consequently, has multiple strands. In this discussion of
ideology, the focus is upon the notion of ideology as a broad general
concept. Hence, I concern myself with its nature and function as such.
This contrasts with a consideration of ideology as a specific political
doctrine. Of course, an assessment of ideology in the first sense,
conceptually, may be, as one observer has written, "conditioned
'ideologically' in the second sense of personally held political beliefs.4 3
Be that as it may, the concept/doctrine dichotomy in the meaning of
ideology is sufficiently unambiguous as to make it a valid distinction to
draw.
Early writers on the subject emphasized the epistemological aspects of
ideology. For example, this was seen in the work of Antoine Louis Claude
Destutt de Tracy, one of the earliest writers on the subject. For Destutt de
Tracy, ideology had its origins in the Enlightenment critique of "tradition
and prejudice; rational grounded knowledge was to replace the
mystifications of preexisting modes of thought." 44 Relying as it does on
rationality, ideology in this context is said to be empirically based; it is a

42

ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 317 (George A. Kennedy trans.,

Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (defining lexis as "how something is said, style, often word choice,
sometimes composition of sentences or speeches" and logos as "word, sentence, rational argument,
speech, tale, esteem, etc.").
43 See TERRY EAGLETON, IDEOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 242 (Verso 1991) (describing how two
different political groups view themselves as understanding reality and accuse the other of being
ideological).
44

ANTHONY GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY: ACTION, STRUCTURE, AND

CONTRADICTION INSOCIAL ANALYSIS 182 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1979).
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"science des ideas" which describes the "natural history of the mind." 4 5
The goal of ideology was to liberate society from attachments to religion
based superstition by creating a mechanism for analyzing "ideas"society's core beliefs and ideas. 46 The theory of sensationalism, the belief
that "all ideas, all knowledge, and all the faculties of human understanding
- perception, memory, or judgment - rest on sensory data," was central to
47
the epistemological approach to ideology.
Others commentators have focused on the sociological aspects of
ideology. Perhaps the most popular sociological conception of ideology
dictates the work of Karl Marx to be at the center.48 Sociological
definitions of ideology are still commonly split between "Marxist" or "non
Marxist," notwithstanding the fact that interpretations of Marx's views on
ideology have frequently shifted over time. Generally, Marxist theories on
the nature of ideology are seen as both epistemic and sociological in nature,
and have been concerned with notions of truth and falsity of cognition. 49 In
this view, ideology has a distinctly pejorative slant, and is understood to be
a product of illusion which leads to distortion and Marxian "reification"50
making that which is contingent appear to be universal or inevitable.
Though some non-Marxist commentators have retained the pejorative
associations of the concept of ideology, one of the most central nonMarxist strains of ideology is construed as an opposing view because it
tries to neutralize the concept of ideology by functionally differentiating it
from systems of scientific knowledge. Such approaches to ideology appear
to be more sociological than epistemological and are more concerned with
51
the ways ideas function in social life than with their reality or unreality.

45 George Lichtheim, The Concept of Ideology, 4 History and Theory 164, 167 (Random House
1965).
46 JAMES JASINSKI, SOURCEBOOK ON RHETORIC: KEY CONCEPTS IN CONTEMPORARY RHETORICAL

STUDIES 312 (Sage Publ'ns 2001) (explaining that the science of ideas was a way to free society from
the religious tyranny that justified rigid social hierarchies).
47 DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS: STUDIES OF SELECTED PIVOTAL IDEAS 253 (Philip P.
Weiner ed., Charles Scribner's Sons 1968).
48 See RAYMOND BOUDON, THE ANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGY 17-19 (Polity Press 1989) (using Marx's
definition of ideology, and its focus on truth and falsehood, as the point of origin in discussing the
Marxist and non-Marxist lines of thought).
49 See id. at 23 (demonstrating, via a table, the shifts in Marxist definitions of ideology and
contrasting with non-Marxist definitions of ideology, both categorized by the criterion of truth and
falsehood).
50 TERRY EAGLETON, IDEOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 2-3 (Verso 1991) (discussing the pejorative
formulations of the definition of ideology, the Marxist tradition of viewing ideology as a distortion
based on true and false cognition, and that ideology is frequently contingent on one's convictions as
opposed to what actually is).
51 Id. at 3 (characterizing the non-Marxist school of thought as an alternative tradition focused on
the sociological function of ideas instead of the reality or unreality of those ideas).
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These sociological views of ideology often include law and view law as a
distinctly ideological entity.
b. Law as an Ideological Creation
The idea that law is ideological is not new. 52 If law is understood as a
system of enforceable rules governing social relations and legislated by a
political system, it would seem that a connection between law and ideology
is almost a necessary precondition. This is true for two reasons. First,
understanding law as ideology enables a more nuanced and critical view of
the law and its function, hence it helps to clarify a set of vital social
institutions. Second, viewing law as ideology underscores the importance
of non-legal actors and institutions in the formation of law.
Perhaps one of the most forceful accounts of the ideological nature of
law are found in the work of E.P. Thompson. According to Thompson, law
is central to the ideology of dominant groups, and ideology was central to
the law's power and validity. Justice, or the appearance of justice, is a vital
tool of law as ideology:
If the law is evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing,
legitimize nothing, contribute nothing to any class's hegemony.
The essential precondition for the effectiveness of law, in its
function as ideology, is that it shall display an independence from
gross manipulation and shall seem to be just. It cannot seem to be
so without upholding its own logic and criteria of equity: indeed, on
occasion, by actually being just.53
Such discussions of the linkages between rhetoric, ideology and law are
the essence of what is known as critical rhetoric.
III. THE CRITICAL RHETORIC APPROACH
Critical rhetoric is a school of thought which attempts to establish the
importance of rhetoric in non-Platonic terms. This means, among other
things, that rhetoric is broadened from its facile association with
persuasion. The phrase "critical rhetoric" was created by rhetorician
Raymie E. McKerrow, and is meant to describe a two-part task: first,
analyzing the discursive forces of dominating power54 and next, critiquing
52 See COLIN SUMNER, READING IDEOLOGIES: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE MARXIST THEORY OF
IDEOLOGY AND LAW 266-267 (Academic Press 1979); see also PAUL Q. HIRST, ON LAW AND

IDEOLOGY 173 (Humanities Press 1979).
53 E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act 263 (Pantheon Books 1975).
54 See Raymie E. McKerrow, Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis, 56 Comm. Monographs 91,
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liberating power, or freedom. 55 Ultimately, McKerrow viewed this type of
critique as a "critique of ideologies, wherein ideologies [are] perceived as
rhetorical creations." 56 Beyond a general critique of power and freedom,
McKerrow also set forth "principles of praxis" for the application of critical
rhetoric.5 7
A. McKerrow's Two PartProject-The TheoreticalRationale and
Principlesof Praxis
In his work, McKerrow emphasized that critical rhetoric is not to be
construed as a methodology in and of itself wherein there are specific
guides as to how perform the task. 58 Rather, critical rhetoric provides an
"orientation" that helps to draw the parameters of the critic's relationship
with a particular concept. McKerrow thought of critical rhetoric as a
project having a theoretical rationale and principles of praxis.59
The theoretical rationale involved "two 'complementary' phases or
moments of critique." 60 The first was a critique of domination, wherein the
chief focus is on the "discourse of power which creates and sustains the
social practices which control the dominated." 6 1 The second phase of
critique was a critique of freedom, necessary because power is not only
repressive; power, McKerrow asserted, could also be productive or
constitutive. 62 The aim of the critique of freedom was not to counter
domination but to inject a note of skepticism into the workings of political
actors who may themselves be the source of new forms of power and
ultimately domination, although they see themselves as anti-hegemonic. 63
92-93 (1989) (describing domination as the construction of an order by the ruling class, and the
imposition of sanctions for dissenters as a means of establishing bounds accepted by the people in a
community).
55 Id. at 100 (stating that a critic may begin to affirm the possibility of freedom by focusing on the
effects of truth originating from discourses that are neither inherently true or false, and distancing
themselves from preconceived categorizations of what should be scientifically true or false).
56 Id. at 92.
57 Id. at 91-92, 100 (explaining that the second part of the essay discusses the principles of praxis).
58 Id. at 92 (stating that even though the principles are "not an exhaustive account, they constitute
the core ideas of an orientationto critique").
59 McKerrow, supra note 54, at 92 (discussing how the principles underlying a critical practice
"recast the nature of rhetoric from one grounded on Platonic, universalist conceptions of reason to one
that recaptures the sense of rhetoric as contingent, or knowledge as doxastic, and of critique as a
performance").
60 JASINSKI, supra note 46, at 117 (explaining that McKerrow discussed "two 'complementary'
phases or moments of critique, with each phase or moment defined by its understanding of power.").
61 McKerrow, supra note 54, at 92.
62 Id. at 98-99 (describing the idea that power "is not repressive, but productive-it is an active
potentially positive force which creates social relations...").
63 Id. at 96 (asserting that results are never satisfying, and are therefore subject to never-ending
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The ultimate goal was to promote constant reflection and introspection.
McKerrow's principles of praxis thus involved the articulation of eight
principles for understanding critical rhetorical praxis. The first principle
relate back to the proviso that critical rhetoric is not a method. 64 There is
no particular strategy or formula for its performance. Rather, critical
rhetoric is to be viewed as a mechanism for shaping, guiding, and orienting
65
the rhetorical critic in its interactions with a particular subject matter.
This is not to suggest, however, that the mechanism of critical rhetoric
exerts little change upon its objects. McKerrow suggests, for example, that
the sine qua non of critical rhetoric is the reversal of the phrase "'public
address'"'-rather than evaluating public addresses, the critical rhetorician
66
pays attention to the "symbolism which addresses publics".
Such an assertion about reversal mediates for a specific set of
understandings needed to perform critical rhetoric. First, it requires
regarding the text under discussion as only a subset or a fragment of a
larger discursive formation rather than as a fully integral, freestanding
unit. 67 Hence, the text becomes merely a message fragment whose ultimate
force and meaning is determined as it moves in various settings. 68 Second,
because of the effect of fragmentation, the critic is not so much the
interpreter of texts as he is the "inventor" of texts. Third, the identity of the
agent who produces the message, while important in the overall
understanding of the discursive formation, is deemphasized for purposes of
understanding the way in which the broader symbolic structure functions to
address relations of power. 69 Finally, because the function of the message
takes precedence over the source of the message, function is paramount in
choosing what text to make the subject of the critical rhetorical analysis. In
selecting texts for critical rhetorical analysis, there is a move away from socalled elite cultures premised on "universal" standards of social, artistic or
legal meaning, and toward the cultures of local, informal or marginal
skepticism).
64 Id. at 100 (stating that a methodology is not being presented, but rather the author is presenting
an outline of the "orientation" that a critic takes).
65 Id. (explaining that the following section of the essay seeks to outline the "orientation" a critic
will take towards the object of study).
66 McKerrow, supranote 54, at 101.
67 See ALAN HUNT & GARY WIcKHAM, FOUCAULT AND LAW: TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF LAW AS

GOVERNANCE 9 (Pluto Press 1994) (defining "discursive formation" as a "system of more or less stable
elements of discourse that are linked or associated").
68 See JASINSKI, supra note 46, at 117-18 (identifying several diverse discursive practice settings
in which oppression and repression are manifest).
69 See id. at 119 (explaining that critical rhetoric's focus is not on the intentions of the agents that
produced the symbols addressing publics, but is "decenter[ed]," and is "on the way in which symbolic
structures., function to perpetuate or challenge relations of power.").
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communities. 70
Among the several other principles that McKerrow details is that
"naming is the central act of a nominalist rhetoric."71 In McKerrow's view,
this heralds a reinterpretation of abstract categories, one that recognizes the
fact that names and labels wield power, and may be either repressive or
productive, but rarely benign or neutral. Hence, concepts in law such as
"justice" or "liberty" are not and have never existed as universals. In
summary, rhetoric creates ideology and ideology creates, empowers and
sustains law.
The ideograph is one way of accounting for the way in which rhetorical
72
practices engender ideology and then law.
B. The Ideograph as a Means of Understandingthe Ideology and Rhetoric

ofLaw
73
Ideographs are words that contain unique ideological commitments.
The concept was initially conceived by rhetorician Michael Calvin McGee
as a way of addressing what he believed to be two polarities in social and
and
idealist/symbolist notions, or ideology
political thought:
materialist/Marxist notions. 74 Ideographs are distinct from labels and other
terms in that ideographs are "agencies of social control," 75 and "agents of
political conscientiousness." 76 A crucial feature of ideographs is
persuasion, since ideographs are the source of the persuasive power of

70 See id. (describing how, given the emphasis on function, rather than "supposedly universal
standards of artistic excellence," in deciding on what objects to study, critical rhetoric "emphasizes
vernacular cultures and practices over elite cultural practices").
71 McKerrow, supra note 54, at 105.
72 See generally Michael Calvin McGee, The "Ideograph": A Link Between Rhetoric and
Ideology, 6 Q. J. SPEECH 1, Feb. 1980 (framing the ideograph as the link between rhetoric and
ideology).
73 In this regard, ideographs are also akin to the condensation symbol, a concept somewhat similar
to the ideograph in that condensation symbols may be construed as a particular subset of the ideograph.
A condensation symbol is a "name, word, phrase or maxim which stirs vivid impressions involving the
listener's most basic values." See WEAVER, supra note 23, at 219 (classifying "un-American" as a
dividing term which opposes core values). McGee's concept of ideographs also bears some
resemblance to Weaver's notion of "ultimate terms," which Weaver defines as "rhetorical absolutes" or
"terms to which the very highest respect is paid." McGee, in further describing his concept of the
ideograph, speaks of two distinct vocabularies of ideographs: those that unite and those that divide.
JASINSKI, supra note 46, at 309 (discussing Weaver's categories of ideographs including those that
unite and those that divide).
74 See JASINSKI, supra note 46, at 309 (listing McGee's examples of ideographs, "including liberty,
property, law or the rule of law, religion, right of privacy, freedom of speech, and popular sovereignty,"
and explaining how these terms have different notions in "technical" political philosophy than they do
in public discourse).
75 McGee, supra note 72, at 6.
76 Id. at 7.
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political language and the means by which such language exerts social
control. 77
For McGee, the ideograph is a high-order abstraction "representing
collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined
normative goal. It warrants the use of power, excuses behavior and belief
which might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides
behavior and belief into channels easily recognizable by a community as
acceptable and laudable." 78 Ideographs, then, are instrumental in shaping
behavior, and are forms that are embedded in the culture; they are not
passing fancies, or current sayings. Rather, ideographs are the terms we
use to justify decisions, 79 impart value,80 and motivate behavior. 81 Some
examples of ideographs given by McGee are "property," "liberty," "the
82
rule of law," "the right of privacy" and "popular sovereignty."
C. The Contingent and ContestedNature of Ideographs
Ideographs, besides being significant cultural signifiers, are also, because
of their existence as abstractions, highly contingent in meaning, and are
Ideographs are
thus always open to interpretation and negotiation.
"flexible" and their meanings change between contexts and sometimes
even within the same context. 83 An example of this is the way in which the
ideograph "equality" has variable meanings. 84 However, as one observer
points out, ideographs are not "totally arbitrary or absolutely
polysemous."8 5 There is often at least basic agreement on their essential
meanings. These commonly understood meanings arise from "rhetorically
material limits" based on the "range and history of their acceptable usages
in the community" 86 and their relation to other ideographs "relevant to the

77 See id. at 5 ("Ideology in practice is a political language.. .with the capacity to dictate decision
and control public belief and behavior.").
78 Id. at 15.
79 JASINSKI, supra note 46, at 309 (identifying ideographs as terms used to justify decisions).
80 Id. (discussing ideographs that impart value).
81 Id. (explaining that ideographs play a role in motivating behavior).
82 McGee, supra note 72, at 6-7, 13 (identifying examples of ideographs).
83 CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT & JOHN Louis LucAiTEs, CRAFTING EQUALITY: AMERICA'S
ANGLO-AFRICAN WORD xii (Univ. of Chi. Press 1993) (explaining ideographs and their multiple
meanings).
84 See id. at xi-xviii (discussing the idea that an ideograph can have different meanings within a
culture).
85 Id. at xiii.
86 John Louis Lucaites, ConstitutionalArgument in a National Theater: The Impeachment Trial of
Dr.Henry Sacheverell,in POPULAR TRIALS: RHETORIC, MASS MEDIA AND THE LAW 31, 34-35 (Robert
Hariman ed., 1993).
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87
specific rhetorical situation they are employed to modify or mediate."
Moreover, communities are often deeply invested in maintaining the
integrity and "vertical structure" of their ideographs. 88 It has been
suggested, for example, that the formal existence of non-statutory law is a
result of the literature that records ideographic uses in the common law and
other examples of case law. 89
Ideographs are constrained only by their diachronic structure, the history
of the term's usage within the community, and by their synchronic
structure, the ability of proponents to make such terms comport or conflict
with other competing ideographs. An essential query in this regard, then, is
how a specific ideograph accrues meaning in particular rhetorical situations
where it is asked to do the work of a political or legal community. This is
seen where, for example, the ideograph "the right of privacy" is asked to
condemn a specific act of power, such as the enactment of a law to fight the
"war on terror." 90
Ideographic analysis requires more than merely labeling recurring terms.
Rather, according to McGee, critical rhetoricians must consider the
situational function of the ideographs at issue. 9 1 Significant and sustained
ideographic analysis requires an analysis of the history of the particular use
of a term as well as an understanding of the current contextual and
temporal meaning of a term and its interaction with both public and private
meanings. There is a tension, says McGee, between the ideographs of a
community's political vocabulary and the narrative frame in which such
terms are to be understood. This means that more often than not, certain
92
frameworks operate as relatively closed systems of political discourse.
This suggests that in many cases it may not be possible to adopt the
87 Id. at 35.
88 McGee, supra note 72, at 93 ("All communities take pains to record and preserve the vertical
structure of their ideographs.").
89 Id. ("Formally, the body of nonstatutory 'law' is little more than a literature recording
ideographic usages in the 'common law' and 'case law.").
90 See generally, Christian Halliburton, Leveling the Playing Field:A New Theory of Exclusionfor
a Post-PATRIOT Act America, 70 MO. L. REV. 519 (2005) (suggesting that the PATRIOT Act is
inconsistent with established Fourth Amendment law); Nadine Strossen, Safety and Freedom: Common
Concernsfor Conservatives, Libertarians, and Civil Libertarians,29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 73
(2005) (commenting on the balance between civil rights and national security); Adrien Katherine Wing,
Civil Rights in the Post 911 World: Critical Race Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War on
Terrorism, 63 LA. L. REV. 717 (2003) (arguing that in the post-911 world civil rights should move away
from the historical black-white binary and expand to include other groups such as Arabs and Muslims).
91 See JASJNSKI, supra note 46, at 310 (explaining McGee's deeper analysis of ideographs, how
they enable and constrain decision and action).
92 MICHAEL CALVIN MCGEE, 1984: Some Issues in the Rhetorical Study of Political
Communication, in POLITICAL COMMUNICATION YEARBOOK 155, 158-159 (Keith R. Sanders, Dan D.
Nimmo & Lynda Lee Kaid eds., S.111. U. Press 1984) (suggesting that history can shape the meaning of
a term within the context of a community's political vocabulary).
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rhetoric produced in one ideological system for use in another. 93 The
development of ideographic analysis distinct to the legal realm has been
achieved via the creation of what is known as critical legal rhetoric.
IV. THE CRITICAL LEGAL RHETORIC APPROACH AND THE IDEOGRAPH AS A
TOOL OF CRITICAL LEGAL RHETORIC

In Part III, I introduced the notion of critical rhetoric and described it as
a body of thought with goals of establishing rhetoric in non-platonic terms
and offering a critique of ideologies. I then described a principal
mechanism for understanding the relationship between rhetoric, ideology
and law, and the ideograph. Ideographs are words that function as high
order abstractions though they are typically drawn from ordinary language.
Ideographs are linguistic mechanisms employed by a community to express
its system of values and beliefs. I now turn to a discussion of how the
ideograph functions within the structure of critical legal rhetoric, which is
distilled from the critical rhetoric approach.
A. The Originsand Nature of CriticalLegal Rhetoric
"Critical legal rhetoric" grows out of the critical rhetoric approach. The
concept was introduced by Marouf Hasian, Jr.94 Hasian describes critical
legal rhetoric as a process of legal analysis that goes beyond looking at
precedent and "black letter" law and being skeptical about scholars' claims
about the nature of law. 95 In developing a critical legal methodology that
involves both legal and extralegal actors, those within the legal sphere and
those in the wider world outside of the legal community, Hasian creates
what he calls "substantive units of analysis" to form the structure of such
discussions. The foundational unit that Hasian adopts is McGee's notion of
the ideograph. Ideographic analysis via critical legal rhetoric here becomes
a potent tool to express the rhetoric and ideology of law. It has been
employed, for example, to assess the more practical aspect of the
functioning of law. 96 Ideographic analysis has also been used to assess the
93 Id. (reasoning that, because the meaning of a political term is related to the history of the
community using it, another community could apply a different meaning to that term).
94 See HASIAN, supra note 1, at 13 ("For scholars to contemplate the possibility of a 'critical' legal
rhetoric, they need to develop perspectives that treat the idioms of the law as discursive phenomena that
are neither rigidly objective nor nihilistic in nature.").
95 Id. at 2 (noting that while seminal judicial opinions and other "orthodox texts" play an important
role in legal research, "legal studies must begin to take seriously the notion that there are many more
social actors involved in the creation, maintenance, and recirculation of jurisprudential ideas").
96 See Ann Sinsheimer, The Ten Commandments As A Secular Historic Artifact Or Sacred
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meaning of broad socio-legal concepts, such as the term "liberty" and all
that it embodies. 97
As Hasian acknowledges, a number of "critical theorists" take a stance
similar to his, challenging the boundaries of conventional legal analysis.
Among these are adherents of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) school and
the various strains that have grown from it, such as Critical Race Theory
(CRT), Black Critical Theory (Blackcrit), Latino Critical Theory (Latcrit)
or Feminist Legal Studies (FLS). However, what is unique to the critical
legal rhetoric approach is its focus on discursive practices and more
specifically rhetorical practices in the law to problematize the notion of a
fixed boundary between concepts such as "the rule of law" and "the rule of
men," or, more generally, between rhetoric and reality. , By engaging
rhetorical practices, critical legal rhetoric endeavors to take seriously the
claims of extrajudicial actors, acknowledging them as interlocutors in a
public, rather than private, conversation about what the law is. Perhaps
what most distinguishes critical legal rhetoric from other critical
approaches to law is that it exists as a critical methodology that may be
used in conjunction with, and not instead of, other critical methods. It is
very often in fact a tool to expose the use of other critical methods. Critical
legal rhetoric may in addition be used as a means of expressing, articulating
or ordering other critical methodologies.
B. The Basic Assumptions of CriticalLegal Rhetoric

It is important to make clear the nature of critical legal rhetoric since, as
it has been observed, rhetorical analysis in and of itself is not a
methodology. 98 Rhetoricians may employ a great variety of techniques to
analyze the broad phenomenon of persuasion. 99 This is no less true in the
field of critical legal rhetoric. In elaborating on the parameters of critical
legal rhetoric, Hasian sets forth five basic assumptions that are at the heart
of a critical legal rhetoric approach. The assumptions are generally
Religious Text: Using Modrovich v. Allegheny County To Illustrate How Words Create Reality, 5 U.
MD L. J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 325, 349 (2005) (discussing how ideographic analysis
may be used as a legal educational tool to help students to assess legal arguments, improve oral
argument skills and writing skills, and improve lawyering overall); see also Mihaela Popescu & Oscar
H. Gandy, Jr., Whose EnvironmentalJustice? Social Identity and Institutional Rationality, 19 J. ENVTL.
L. & LITIG. 141, 164 (2004) (describing the extent to which the ideograph has also been used to analyze
the notion of community identity in environmental law).
97 See Warren Sandmann, The Argumentative Creationof IndividualLiberty, 23 HASTINGS CONST.
L. Q. 637, 637-38 (1996) (referring to Michael McGee, supranote 72 at 6).
98 See Jerry Frug, supranote 33, at 871-72 (1988) (rejecting Enlightenment "reason" as foundation
for law in favor of rhetorical argumentation).
99 Id. at 872-73 (discussing the character method of constructing legal arguments).
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described as:
1) Legal formalism obscures rather than clarifies judicial rules and
norms in the United States. 100
2) A small group of "empowered elites" profit from the denial of the
rhetorical nature of law. 101
3) There are multiple possible views of law and equity, and prevailing
norms exist in part because of "chance, visions losing out, the
02
forgetfulness of some, and the sharp memories of others."1
4) Because law is essentially contingent, often employing "fabrication
in place of discovery, and artifice as well as science," historical
103
studies are needed to look beyond official "precedents."'
5) Critical legal rhetoric involves both deconstructive and
reconstructive aspects of the law, that is, querying the givens of law
while providing what he describes as a "vernacular" voice for
104
alternate views in both the public and private spheres.
These assumptions are at the heart of critical legal rhetorical analysis. I
next apply this methodology to the Slave Descendants Case.
V. HASIAN'S SUBSTANTIVE UNITS OF ANALYSIS AND IN RE AFRICANAMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS

The judicial opinion rendered on the motion to dismiss in In Re AfricanAmerican Slave Descendants Litigation relies upon a number of concepts
that have multiple, particularized meanings both within the legal sphere and
without. Here, I identify and focus on the following concepts as substantive
rhetorical units:
Ideographs
-Slavery
-Standing

100 HASIAN, supra note 1, at 4 ("Legal formalism hides the constitutive nature of America's
judicial rules and norms.").
101 Id. ("[T]he more we see [law] as a deductive, logical system of inquiry, the more we move
away from the Greek notion of phronesis, or practical wisdom. Studying the 'rule of law' becomes the
professional occupation of only a few rather than the duty of the many.").
102 Id.
103 Id.

104 Id.
at 4-5 (referring to Hasian's fifth basic assumption of the critical legal rhetoric approach).
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Characterizations
-Slaves
-Slave traders
Narratives and Myths-I discuss the concept below both in its function
as narratives and more broadly as myths
-The Causes of the Civil War
Memories
-Whether reparations were previously paid to blacks
My analysis leads to an understanding of the Slave Descendants case as
an example of Weiner's Black trial. African-ancestored blacks in the
United States are, in the context of this decision, constructed as outsiders,
foreigners or "non-belongers" in the United States. The black trial is
broadly constitutive of the legal narratives that form the contours of legalhistorical creation myths that purport to explain black presence and the
black experience in the United States and in its legal system.
A. Slavery as an Ideograph in General
In order to name and define rhetorical practices at work in the Slave
Descendants case, it is necessary to delineate the ways in which particular
advocates, especially those in judicial settings, have steered the ideological
commitments of the majority. The concept of ideographs is useful for this
task because it enables the analyst to follow the trajectory of key phrases or
even single words that are, in McGee's words, "more pregnant [with
meaning] than propositions ever could be." 105 In a critical legal rhetoric
approach, language is not a neutral delivery device for power but retains
the residue of previous struggles. It is by these means that legal advocacy
and legal conclusions empower or disempower people.
Certain ideographs may have more power than others to guide or shape
behavior, usually by branding as unacceptable certain behaviors. Using the
word 'slavery' is one such behavior.m06 Slavery, as a condition of
involuntary servitude, is a concept that undermines the very foundation of
the American ethos. "America" is itself arguably an ideograph that
conveys both physical and ideological freedom and autonomy; one need
105 McGee, supra note 72, at 7.
106 See id. at 15 (contrasting ideographs that guide thoughts and actions into acceptable "channels"
with those, like "slavery," that negatively classify certain behaviors).
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only look to the numerous legal documents, treatises and other artifacts of
the American socio-legal culture that treat America as a concept more than
a place. America as freedom has been frequently hailed in song, such as in
the lyrics of "America," which intones in its first line America's status as a
"sweet land of liberty. "America" functions as a national anthem though
not officially serving as such.10 7 Slavery is as a result, by its very
definition, antithetical to the broad notion of America. Yet, slavery not
only existed but flourished in the United States of America, and its harms,
some argue, have yet to abate.
B. The Meaning of Slavery in Slave Descendants
In the Slave Descendants case, the reader is immediately introduced to
slavery in the opening sentence of Judge Norgle's opinion: "This case
arises out of the institution of human chattel slavery as it existed in the
North American colonies and the later formed United States of
America."1 08 First, it is important to note the extent to which the judge goes
to make known the negative valence of the word 'slavery.' Slavery is, by
definition, the condition of one human person as the legal property of
another. Therefore, to say that slavery is "an institution" and one of
"chattel slavery" almost creates a hyperbolic over-description that threatens
to undermine its meaning in simple terms. Such uses of hyperbole are
often meant not to clarify, but to obfuscate, and to turn attention away from
the horrors described by not giving the reader or listener a chance to gasp
or remonstrate at the existence of a wrong.109
The use of hyperbole here functions in much the same way that an
under-description would function: it renders the propositions being
discussed vague and shows a tentative commitment to them.110 This
vagueness can and often does result in indeterminacies in legal rights and
obligations. The judge's language here seems to say, "I know that it
[slavery] is bad, it is very bad. I know it and acknowledge it so now let us
all get over it." This is clear in the sentence following, where the judge
107 See Robert James Branham, "Of Thee I Sing": Contesting "America," 48 AM. Q. 623, 627, 633
(1994) (describing the ideographic implications of the song "America" and citing it as a "discourse on
citizenship", a "claim of belonging," and a "touchstone" for those seeking freedom, such as immigrants
and blacks).
108 In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 726 (N.D. I11.2005).
109 Edward Said, Dreams and Delusions, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY, Aug. 21, 2003, http://weekly.
ahram.org.eg/2003/652/opl.htm (explaining how hyperbole has been used to describe the harmful
effects of terrorism).
110 TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 33 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (discussing the
way uninformative utterances are vague).
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indicates that allegations in the plaintiffs complaint "retell the generally
acknowledged horrors of the institution of slavery, and the malignant
actions of the sovereigns, entities, and individuals, foreign and domestic,
that supported that institution. '' II
The plaintiffs' claims about the effects of slavery are, according to the
judge, a "retelling," signaling a reduced need to listen. The story is about
"horrors," says Judge Norgle, but they are "generally acknowledged"they are already known and accounted for. Moreover, we are to understand
that the horrors of slavery have resulted not chiefly or at all from the
actions of individuals, but from the actions of intangible collectives:
"sovereigns" and the nebulous "entities," both "foreign and domestic."
Slavery, we are told, grows out of a "tragic" and "deplorable" period in
"our Nation's history."' 12 This seems to say that, sad as slavery was, it was
but an unfortunate historical error that has come and gone. With this
discourse presented at the opening of the opinion, the judge lunges and the
defendants dance immediately out of the plaintiffs' reach.
In grappling with the meaning of slavery, the judge next turns to what he
terms "Historical Overview of Slavery in America." 1 13 Slavery is now, in
Judge Norgle's words, an "immoral institution of human chattel slavery"
whose nature Judge Norgle will "elucidate" by offering a definition of
slavery.'1 4 The judge, by citing a former slave, defines slavery as
"receiving by irresistiblepower the work of another man, and not by his
consent."11 5 There is, says the judge, an "essential unfairness" of
slavery. 116
On one hand, to say that something is essential goes to the heart of the
matter and, hence, may suggest that the judge sees the lack of fairness as
irrefutable. On the other hand, the use of the word 'essential' here suggests
that the unfairness is so central to the matter that either it is not easily
discernible or it need not be remarked. As one observer has written, in the
context of feminist jurisprudential assessments of the law and what makes
law male, "to qualify [terms] is to weaken [them].""l 7 In this context,
where the issue is race and not gender, I believe that observation is equally
III See Slave Descendants, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 726 (summarizing the plaintiffs' allegations).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. (explaining that the court will proceed with a brief historical analysis of slavery, the first
step of which requires a definition of slavery).
115 Id.
116 Slave Descendants, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 727.
117

JUDITH A. BAER, OUR LIVES BEFORE THE LAW: CONSTRUCTING A FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE

69 (Princeton Univ. Press 1999).
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cogent, as there are clear similarities in the power dynamics between men
and women and blacks and whites in the United States. Here, at first look,
the qualification "essential" seems to be a concession to the black plaintiffs
and a snub to the white defendants. However, a closer look reveals
otherwise.
Despite its asserted "essential unfairness," United States slavery
managed to exist for hundreds of years, even in light of broadly shared
notions of "fairness." These notions were often taken to mean procedural
fairness that exists outside of the core "essential" unfairness when the
formal law sanctions an otherwise immoral practice. In the context of
slavery, there was apparently, in the minds of many, a clear delineation
between law as procedural fairness and law as substantive fairness. Many
scholars have discussed the fact that there existed a number of jurists in the
antebellum United States who, with rare exceptions, interpreted laws
enforcing slavery to support the institution despite espousing anti-slavery
rhetoric and expressing support for the abolitionist cause in other
venues.1 18
Later in the opinion, in a section titled "Slavery and Morality," the judge
states, "[T]he immorality of the institution of slavery is obvious."' 19 While
this would appear to be a concession to the plaintiffs in Slave Descendants
regarding the nature of slavery and their claims, a closer look reveals it to
be an example of the same type of distancing seen at the beginning of the
opinion when Judge Norgle suggests that slavery was an institution
resulting from the acts of certain entities. 120 The judge never states that
"slavery is immoral," but instead cites the immorality of the institution of
slavery. Rather than using the adjective 'immoral' to bring immediacy and
clarity to the wrongs of slavery, the judge creates a refuge by declaring
slavery to be an 'institution.' This use of an abstract noun formulation is
often subject to the critique that it obscures rather than clarifies
definitions.121
118 See, e.g., DAVID DYZENHAUS, JUDGING THE JUDGES, JUDGING OURSELVES: TRUTH,
RECONCILIATION AND THE APARTHEID LEGAL ORDER 73-74 (1998) (citing ROBERT M. COVER,
JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 226-29 (1975) (discussing "judicial

response patterns" and issues that arose through responses by abolitionist judges required to interpret
statutes which had enforced slavery in nineteenth-century America).
119 Slave Descendants,375 F. Supp. 2d at 729.
120 Id. at 726 ("The allegations ... retell the generally acknowledged horrors of the institution of
slavery, and the malignant actions of the sovereigns, entities, and individuals, foreign and domestic, that
supported that institution.").
121

See DIANA HACKER, THE BEDFORD HANDBOOK 229 (7th ed. 2006) ("Specific, concrete nouns

express meaning more vividly than general or abstract ones. Although general and abstract language is
sometimes necessary to convey your meaning, ordinarily prefer specific, concrete alternatives.").
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Abstract nouns are nouns which express an intangible idea such as a
condition, quality, or mental concept.122 They are formed by adding
suffixes to verbs or, as in the case of 'immoral,' adjectives. 123 Abstract
noun phrases, rather than refer directly to the subject noun itself,
"supernominalize" it; that is, raise the concrete noun (here, 'slavery') to a
higher level of abstraction, beyond a particular or individual example of
slavery.1 24 When writers use abstract nouns rather than the concrete nouns
or adjectives that more directly state the case, they may do so in order to
dignify or rehabilitate the subject or its author or to divert from the nature
of the subject itself.12 5 There is also evidence that the use of such
26
techniques in legal writing renders such writings difficult to understand.1
Despite the use of the word 'obvious,' this distancing from the immoral
nature of slavery is palpable.
The use of abstract nouns and abstract noun phrases is closely related to
another rhetorical distancing technique, the choice of passive voice versus
active voice. The two are related because the passive voice is typically
achieved by the use of abstract nouns and the avoidance of active verbs or
adjectives.127 Active voice is distinguished from passive voice by the
identity of the actor. Active voice is performative, and the subject and verb
relationship is straightforward.128 Passive voice is the form of the verb that
shows that the grammatical subject is the person or thing to which the
action in the verb is done. Often, with passive voice, the agent of the
action is not specified, so the agent may be kept out of focus.129 It has been

122 HOWARD JACKSON, GRAMMAR AND VOCABULARY 35-36 (Routledge 2002).

123 Id. at 6, 79. (explaining that to establish word classes two important characteristics can help
since, first, most of the words have a plural form--it is a characteristic of nouns to have a singular and a
plural form, and second, some of the words have derivational endings that are characteristics of nouns,
for example "ness," "ism," and "ing").
124 FRANK B. EBERSOLE, LANGUAGE AND PERCEPTION: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE 47-52 (Univ. Press of Americal979) (providing an example of an abstract noun phrase with
"the game of baseball" as opposed to simply "baseball"; the "game of baseball" conveys the broader
systemic aspects of baseball itself, whether methodological, economic, social or even philosophical).
125 See, e.g., TERRI LECLERCQ, EXPERT LEGAL WRITING 52 (Univ. of Tex. Press 1995) ("When
writers use abstract rather than concrete words, they may be responding to an innate need to dignify the
subject-and its author.").
126 John Gibbons, Language and the Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS 285 (Alan
Davies & Catherine Elder eds., 2006) (discussing the fact that "linguistic aspects of the law raise many
issues and difficulties" because the written language of "legislation and regulation is difficult" for lay
people to understand).
127 DIANA HACKER, RULES FOR WRITERS 80 (6th ed. 2008) (discussing passive voice and methods
for avoiding its use).
128 WILSON FOLLETr, MODERN AMERICAN USAGE 345-47 (Jacques Barzun ed., Hill and Wang
Inc. 1966) (describing the properties of active voice).
129 Id at 347 (describing in some sentences with passive voice, there may be confusion as to who
the agent is).
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observed that in legal and law-related documents, the passive voice is often
used to make vague allegations by suppressing the agent of the action with
the passive voice. 130 In short, passive voice may allow writers to avoid
commitment to a particular proposition.
Active voice is generally preferred in legal writing because it indicates
that the subject is central to rather than peripheral to the proposition being
stated. Active voice is clearer because it focuses the reader's attention on
the "doer of the action." It is also more concise because it usually involves
fewer words. Because of the power active voice has to expose not only
injustice, but doers of injustice, choosing to use the passive voice often
diminishes the impact of the articulations of power the dominant use to
control the oppressed, and the descriptions of harms caused by this power.
This is seen in the classic phrase of responsibility avoidance: "[]istakes
were made."131 Obscuring the agency of the powerful in such matters is
often crucial in a modem world wherein civility mandates that infelicitous
expressions of raw power be avoided. For example, in the context of male
hegemony over women, it has been suggested that using the passive voice
to describe what occurs when men victimize women is "safer and easier"
because it avoids accusations that statements about the harm men
sometimes cause women constitutes male-bashing.132 In such contexts,
using the passive rather than the active voice not only diminishes the
responsibility of the wrongdoer but, in ironic fashion, suggests the
wrongdoer would himself be victimized if his wrongdoing were made
manifest.
I now turn to a discussion of standing as an ideograph.
C. Standingas an Ideograph in General
Standing doctrine involves the issue of who, if anyone, is entitled to
prosecute a particular legal claim in court. 133 It is part of the United States
Constitution's Article III case or controversy requirement.134 Standing is
130 TIMOTHY A. 0. ENDICOTr, VAGUENESS IN LAW 32 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001) (explaining the
role vagueness plays in verbal and written communication).
131 Ishtla Singh, Language, Thought and Representation, in LANGUAGE, SOCIETY AND POWER 17,
29-30 (Ishtla Singh & Jean Stilwell Peccei eds., Routledge 2004) (illustrating the links between
language use and perception within and among languages).
132 Id. at 30 (analyzing how structural choices in language communicate perception and blame).
133 William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L. J. 221, 222-23 (1998) (discussing
the role of standing in federal courts and proposing that standing should be determined on the merits of
a plaintiff's claim).
134 U.S. CONST. art. I11,§ 2, cl. I (requiring that the "judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution ... [and] to Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party").
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the requirement that a person bringing a suit is the proper party to request
adjudication of the issue involved. The test traditionally applied is whether
the party had a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy presented
and whether the dispute touched upon the legal relations of the parties with
adverse legal interests. The personal stake must be particular to the parties
35
and not a general claim shared by all.1
Questions regarding standing typically concern public law questions
such as inquiries into constitutionality and challenges of government
action. 136 The matter of standing is very important to the process of
accessing justice, and because of its role as gatekeeper, jurisprudential
articulations which broaden the commonly understood notions of standing,
and hence grant more access to the courts, may be seen as assaults upon the
37
court in its role as a "bastion of stability."
Despite its importance as a fundamental requirement for access to the
court system, the concept of "standing" is in fact relatively modem, first
appearing in United States Supreme Court rulings in the late 1930s, and not
taking on its present form until the 1970s. 138 A number of legal scholars
who have studied the issue have concluded that the framers of the United
States Constitution never intended standing, a term absent from the
Constitution, to serve as an independent test for identifying who can
properly bring a legal claim in federal court. Instead, it has been argued,
the framers believed that Congress should have broad power to enact
legislation granting citizens the right to sue. The Supreme Court of the
United States has stated, "[i]n essence the question of standing is whether
the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of
particular issues." 139
The United States Supreme Court standing requirement is grounded in
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, which grants the judiciary the
power to hear 'cases' and 'controversies.' The Court has stated that the
requirement that litigants demonstrate their standing to sue under the
135 JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO THE CONSTITUTION: HOW THE SUPREME
COURT HAS RULED ON ISSUES FROM ABORTION TO ZONING 474 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1999) (reviewing

how the Supreme Court has ruled on issues from abortion to zoning).
136 Scorr DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE THOMAS 105

(N.Y. Univ. Press 1999) ("Standing cases almost always are concerned with public law questions such
as determinations of constitutionality and review of governmental action.").
137 ROBERT HEINEMAN, AUTHORITY AND THE LIBERAL TRADITION: FROM HOBBES TO RORTY 167

(Transaction Publishers 1993).
138

See generally JILL NORGREN & SERENA NANDA, AMERICAN CULTURAL PLURALISM AND THE

LAW (Praeger Publishers 2006) (providing a collection of cases that deal with many aspects of cultural
pluralism throughout American history).
139 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498 (1975).
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Constitution confines the judiciary to its limited role in the system of
separation powers. 140 Because of this, federal courts may exercise power
only "in the last resort, and as a necessity."' 4' Hence, the standing
requirement helps to ensure that cases filed in federal court result in the
type of clearly articulated, "adversarial contests which the courts are
institutionally competent to resolve."' 142
Under the modem standing doctrine, a plaintiff must meet three
requirements to have Article III standing. First, the plaintiff must show
that he has suffered an "injury in fact."' 143 Next, the plaintiff must establish
causation by demonstrating that the injury "fairly can be traced to the
challenged action."144 Finally, the plaintiff must show that the injury "is
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision" of the court. 145 Because of
its primacy in the process of bringing a case to court, standing, in terms of
ideographic analysis, is what Kenneth Burke has called a "title" or "godterm," a term "implicit in all other terms and from which all other terms
strive."146 147 Standing in the United States jurisprudential context is,
along with other jurisdictional requirements, part of the clear essence of
having one's day in court. Standing asks the plaintiff not only, "what is the
problem?," but also a series of subsequent and closely related questions
such as: "is it your problem?" and "is your problem continuing?"
D. Standing as an Ideograph in Slave Descendants
In the Slave Descendants case, the plaintiffs' principal claim for redress
fell under what has been called a "traditional model" of reparations in
which the claimants sought redress on behalf of the descendants of

140 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (noting that the United States Constitution creates a
tripartite model of governance in which political power is divided between the legislative, executive and
judicial branches and under this model, each branch has separate and independent powers and areas of
responsibility; however, each branch may also be able to place limits on the power exerted by the other
branches).
141 Id. (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892)).
142 Standing, GEORGETOWN ENVTL. L. & POL'Y INST., available at http://www.law.georgetown

.edu/gelpi/research-archive/standing (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
143 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
144 The Presbyterian Church v. United States., 870 F.2d 518, 521 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Valley
Forge Christian College v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. 454 U.S. 464, 472
(1982)).
145 Id.
146 RICHARD H. THAMES, KENNETH BURKE AND THE 21ST CENTURY, 24 (Bernard L. Brock ed.,

State Univ. of N.Y. Press 1999).
147 Peter A. Cramer, DiabolicalDesign': The Charleston Elite, The 1822 Slave Insurrection and
the Discourse of the Supernatural, in THE MEMORY OF CATASTROPHE 39 (Peter Gray & Kendrick
Oliver eds., 2004).
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slaves.148 The plaintiffs argued that their injury stemmed from the

institution of slavery, and they articulated four specific injuries that they
believed were sufficient to confer them standing to maintain the suit. First,
the plaintiffs alleged the following: they continue to suffer concrete, direct
harm as descendants of slaves because they do not presently have "the
same opportunities as [do] their white contemporaries;" 14 9 they are forced
to "overcome barriers to their human right to development which their
white contemporaries [do] not;"150 they "suffer irreparable psychological
damage from the loss of their history, language and culture"'51 and, they do

not "know the actual birth names of... their forbearers and, consequently,
to this day do not know their own real names." 152 Next, plaintiffs alleged

that a subset of the plaintiff class were themselves actually enslaved in the
twentieth century.153 Plaintiffs then alleged that because they had filed or
would file the necessary paperwork to become administrators of their

ancestor's estates, they have suffered an actual, particularized injury by

54
being denied their rightful inheritances. 1
In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that they "suffered segregation, lost
opportunity, diminished self-worth and value, loss of property rights, loss
of derivative property rights, and psychological harm. . ."155 Plaintiffs

further claimed that they were "consumers of defendants" and were injured
by certain communications made by the defendants concerning defendants'
respective roles in the institution of slavery.156 Related to their role as
consumers, the plaintiffs alleged specifically that, "[d]ue to
unconscionable, fraudulent and deceptive public communications made by
defendants, plaintiffs suffered the harm of being misled, confused, and
deceived about the roles the defendants played in the enslavement of
148 Eric J. Miller, Representing the Race: Standing to Sue in Reparations Lawsuits, 20 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 91, 93 (2004) (explaining that the first model of the suit brought for reparations
against a defendant was brought by the descendants of slaves).
149 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the Second
Amended and Consolidated Complaint at 2, In re African-Am. Slave Descendant's Litig., 471 F.3d. 754
(N.D. Ill. 2006).
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 150, at 2 ("In addition, there are particular Plaintiffs Cain Wall and his children, and the Estate of Emma Clark - whose allegations of actual enslavement in
the 20th century further satisfy the requirement of an 'injury-in-fact."').
154 Id. ("In the SACC, some plaintiffs ... have already filed to be administrators of the estates of
their enslaved ancestors thus removing one more alleged obstacle to standing. Other plaintiffs will soon
file the requisite papers.").
155 Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint at T 108, In re African-Am. Slave Descendant's
Litig., 471 F.3d. 754 (N.D. 11. 2006).
156 Id. at 104.
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African people."' 15 7 Plaintiffs further claimed injury through defendants'
alleged continuing violation of state consumer protection laws.
The judge flatly rejected the plaintiffs' claims of standing to raise these
claims. In doing so, Judge Norgle first relied on the words of another,
quoting from a law review article in which the author seemed to reject
standing for the descendants of slaves, stating, "Descent from slaves is not
of itself an injury, rather the sorts of legally relevant injuries are harms
suffered by individuals that are attributable to the ongoing effects of
slavery."158 This assertion in the law review article led the judge to state,
on his own, that plaintiffs could not meet the standing requirement because
they based their claim on "injuries to their long-dead ancestors," which, in
the judge's view, could not possibly be "causing them concrete harm
today."
Going further, Judge Norgle came close to ridiculing the plaintiffs' claim
that they had standing because they suffered some derivative harm due to
the enslavement of their ancestors.
The plaintiffs asserted in their
complaint that "[e]ach Plaintiff African-American slave descendant has
suffered by the Defendants['] failure to pay their ancestors for their labor as
slaves or as sharecroppers, peons or even slaves." 159 However, the judge
said this was not enough. Judge Norgle's rejection of the plaintiffs'
derivative claim for standing was a mortal wound to the plaintiffs' case,
since it was one of the most substantial of the plaintiffs' claims. By any
ordinary reading, the plaintiffs' claims for redress were simple and clear;
therefore, the "actual injury" requirement was plainly fulfilled. The
plaintiffs stated the corporations had harmed either them or others whom
they were legally entitled to represent - including elderly relatives, some
who died a long time before and some who had died only recently. There
is ample jurisprudence in the area of wrongful death claims that allows
family members to "step into the shoes" of plaintiffs who died before a
case could be brought.160 The judge's ruling, however, never considered
the applicability of this type of claim.
Ideographs are too often the romantic and idealized view of our own

157
158
Miller,
159

Id.
In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp 2d. 721, 747 (N.D. I11.
2005); see
supra note 149, at 97.
Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint, supra note 156, at I 11.

160 THOMAS R. VAN DERVORT, AMERICAN LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER

THE LAW 128-29 (Marlene McHugh Pratt ed., Thomson Learning 2000) (noting that unlike commonlaw concepts, modem legislative enactments provide for "status to sue on behalf of the estate of the
deceased person").
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normative commitments. 16 1 They exist as reductions of the interaction of
lived reality and what is hoped for, both in the past, as well as in the
present and future. The analysis presented above shows how slavery and
standing function as ideographs in Slave Descendants. I now turn to a
discussion of characterizations.
E. Characterizations
Characterizations are perhaps the most fundamental, yet the most
difficult to articulate of Hasian's discursive units. 162 The notion of
"forming one's character" describes the process whereby one creates a
persona that places oneself within a community of discourse. Such
163
communities are bound by common cultures, interests and languages.
These characterizations are contingent and are constantly being redefined
and mediated. Moreover, characterizations involve a melange of literary,
164
psychological and sociological overtones.
In the literary realm, interpreting character is largely akin to
understanding a character via descriptions of that character in a novel by a
narrator. Of course, narrators vary-they may be omniscient or partially
Ultimately,
omniscient, reliable or unreliable, among other things.
however, a reader must respond to the narrator's assertions in order to
interpret a text. Reading for character requires interpreting a text, not the
personality of the author. Yet this itself is a matter of some dispute.165
The psychological aspects of character provide the normative element in
addition to the literary aspect.166 Character in this sense has traditionally
been seen as the sum of who a person is. Character as a sociological
concept refers to the unity of the "psychic" aspect of a person and the
social roles that person fulfills. 167 All aspects of character, however,
161 Michael C. McGee, The Origins of "Liberty": A Feminization of Power, in 47 COMM.
MONOGRAPHS 23, 45 (1980) (stating that Americans have "romanticized [their] own normative
commitments" in an effort to combat new European political ideologies).
162

CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT,

DECODING ABORTION

RHETORIC: COMMUNICATING

SOCIAL

CHANGE 201 (Univ. of Ill. Press 1994) (explaining that it is easy to create forceful characterizations, but
that it is "equally difficult" to challenge such characterizations directly).
163 HASIAN, supra note 1,at 133 ("'Forming one's character' means creating a persona that places
one's self within communities of discourse, which share cultures, interests, and languages.").
164 Frug, supra note 33, at 873 (deciding to discuss persuasion in terms of the word "character"
precisely because of "its overlapping literary, psychological and sociological overtones").
165 Id. (noting that reading for character is a "controversial matter," and the relationship between a
narrator of a text and its author "is itself a matter of interpretation").
166 See id. at 873-74 (stating that the sociology of explaining a person's character helps illuminate
not only who a person is, but also how the person appears to society).
167 Id. at 874 ("Finally 'character' is a familiar sociological concept: 'It refers to the relatively
stabilized integration of ...a person's psychic structure linked with the social roles of the person."')
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particularly those in a legal setting, ultimately provide society with
normative bearings for understanding how reasonable, "law-abiding
68
citizens ought to act or behave."1
According to Hasian, characterizations in the law are often conceived
along a spectrum that defines "conservative, moderate and radical"
examples of behavior. 169 This is so that characters "can dramatize, even
embody, contrasting ways of life."1 70 In service to this goal, judicial actors,
rather than simply interpreting law, perform prudential characterizations
that are drawn from "the broader 'rhetorical culture.' In order to offer
greater clarification of Hasian's notion of characterization in critical legal
rhetoric, below I discuss Hasian's illustration of characterization via the
case of Leo Frank. 171
a. An Example of the Creation and Function of Characterization: The
Leo Frank Case
Leo Frank was a Jewish manager of a pencil factory in Atlanta, Georgia
accused of raping and murdering an employee, thirteen-year-old Mary
Phagan, the daughter of white tenant farmers. Initially, two black workers
were arrested and interrogated about the crime, but, according to
prosecutors, all evidence pointed to Frank. Frank was tried and convicted.
Although the governor of Georgia ultimately commuted Frank's death
sentence to life imprisonment, Frank was taken from custody and
lynched. 172
Hasian uses the Frank case to illustrate his notion of characterization in
the critical legal rhetorical sense by describing the characterizations that
were seized upon both by the legal establishment and the public at large,
and how these characterizations were crucial in determining how the trial
was categorized and blame apportioned. According to Hasian, Mary
Phagan was a "perfectly innocent child,"173 a "Northern Jew"' 174 who was a
(quoting HANS HEINRICH GERTH AND C.WRIGHT MILLS, CHARACTER AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS, 22 (Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964)).
168
ASIANsupra note 1, at 133.
169 Id. at 133-34.
170 Id. at 135 (quoting Frug, supranote 33 at 875).

171 Frank v. Mangum 27 U.S. 309, 323 (1915) (affirming the lower court's denial of a Due Process
motion for a new trial).
172 Eric M. Freedman, In Memoriam: Frank M. Johnson, Jr.: Milestones in Habeas Corpus - Part
II Leo Frank Lives: Untanglingthe Historical Roots of Meaningful Federal Habeas Corpus Review of
State Convictions, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1467, 1496-97 (2000) (detailing that after the commutation, riots
began throughout the streets and Frank was taken from prison and lynched by a number of important
citizens).
173 HASLAN, supra note 1, at 132.
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"the victim of a pervert."1 75 One of the principal prosecution witnesses, a
black janitor named Jim Conley, was initially accused of committing the
crime. Conley played the role of the "good Negro," docile, single-minded,
and truthful. He testified with such veracity that "[t]he leading prosecutor
would later write in a pamphlet that Conley's circumstantial evidence was
as strong as 'cables."1 76 Ultimately, according to Hasian, the
characterizations created in the Frank case required the reconstruction, in
some cases radical, of certain widely held beliefs about gender and race.
b. Reconstructions of Gender in the FrankCase
According to Hasian, through characterization, Mary Phagan, became
emblematic of white Southern womanhood.177 Southern womanhood was
understood as a key narrative in giving context to what it means to be
"Southern." At least since the Civil War and probably well before, the
South had been in a contest for control over the characterizations that
formed the body of its narratives. Hence, the South saw itself as peopled
by "gallant cavaliers" who struggled to preserve race and culture.178 The
Southern lady was exemplary of the highest ideals of both notions. 179 The
North, in contrast, viewed the South as "relatively static, stratified,
economically sluggish, insulated, and quasi-aristocratic."' 180 It was,
according to Hasian, within this contested terrain that new characterizations
about the notion of Southern womanhood were formulated. Mary Phagan
became the "iconic representation of a rural South that found itself violated
82
by a financially healthy North."181 She was a symbol of the "Old South,"1
and, through her diverse interest, groups such as upper class whites,
religious fundamentalists, and poor rural whites found in her a common
cause. 183
c. Reconstructions of Race in the FrankCase
It is perhaps difficult to imagine the events occurring in the Frank case
between 1913 and 1915 as having in any way radically reformulated the
174 Id.

175
176
177
178
179
180

Id.
Id. at 137.
HASAIN, supra note 1, at 141.
Id.at 140.
Id.
Id.

181

Id.

182 HASIAN, supra note 1, at 141.
183 Id.at 141.
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racial climate of the South. During this period the racist policies of the Jim
Crow laws were in full vigor, and the gulf between blacks and whites was
arguably as vast as ever. Jim Crow laws were a series of laws enacted
mostly in the Southern United States in the latter half of the nineteenth
century that restricted most of the new privileges granted to blacks after the
Civil War. 184 Lynching, the extra judicial killing of racially different
Others, especially blacks, by vigilante groups, was at an all time high.185
Lynching was, according to one commentator, a "racial project" which
was, for some period of United States history and in some regions of the
United States, the rule and not the exception in meting out punishment to
certain black males for perceived transgressions.186 And yet, according to
Hasian, the Frankcase represented a reorientation in the way that race was
understood in the South.
Before Frank, the public understanding of race was very much linked to
a simplistic black/white binary in which blacks and whites were opposite
poles on the moral, social, economic and legal planes. Blacks were bad,,
poor, not legitimate legal subjects, and existed outside of "decent" white
society. In contrast, whites were good, and constituted the center of the
social milieu. Whites, if not rich, were certainly either middle class or
proud working class. Extremely poor whites existed on the margins, and
were often excoriated as "trash" whose only redeeming attribute was their
whiteness. Whites were, as "canonical people," 87 those by whom and for
whom the law courts had been created; in the courts, whites dispensed
justice and received justice. The case of Leo Frank, however, brought a
new and complex element to the understanding of race. This was true for
two reasons.
First and perhaps foremost, before reaching the decision to prosecute
Leo Frank, two blacks had been considered and then passed over for
prosecution. This in and of itself was seminal-both during the Jim Crow
period and in more contemporary times, blacks were often constructed as
184 RICHARD WORMSER, THE RISE AND FALL OF JIM CROW (St. Martin's Press 2003) (stating that
the phrase Jim Crow was used to describe a complex system of racial laws in the South that help to
establish and maintain white social, political, economic and legal domination of blacks and that Jim
Crow laws began in the 1880's in the Northern states and proliferated throughout the country by World
War I).
185

See MICHAEL J.PFEIFER, ROUGH JUSTICE: LYNCHING AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 1847-1947,

13-37 (Univ. of I11.
Press 2004) (elaborating on the concept of Jim Crow laws).
186 JONATHAN MARKOVITZ, LEGACIES OF LYNCHING: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND MEMORy XX(Univ.

of Minn. Press 2004) (defining racial project as "'simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or
explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular
racial lines."').
187 RICHARD J.F. DAY, MULTICULTURALISM AND THE HISTORY OF CANADLAN DIVERSITY 30

(Univ. of Toronto Press 2002).
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criminals and the notion of choosing a white man in their stead to stand
accused was well outside legal and social norms. Moreover, one of the
principal witnesses in the case was black, and this case is often cited as the
first instance in which a black man was allowed to testify in a Southern
court against a white man. 188 Though dubious as a harbinger of racial
reform, the Frank case gave Southern blacks some small hope that they
might gain more access to the courts and even ultimately receive justice in
the courts. 189 However, what the Frank case changed most about the ways
in which race was understood was not necessarily or even at all the way in
which blackness was perceived. Rather, it was whiteness that was
reconstructed. Whiteness in the South was no longer clearly defined
between black and white; whiteness was now openly contested and in some
cases contingent.
I now turn to the use of characterizations in the Slave Descendants case.
d. Characterizations in the Slave Descendants Case
i. Slaves as Characterizations
Slaves as characterizations are particularly provocative examples of
Hasian's notion of character for purposes of critical legal rhetoric analysis.
This is because, if characterizations in Hasian's purview are to be
conceived along a spectrum of behavior norms in society, slaves are at
something of a unique disadvantage. They were in law and in fact "nonpersons." It was their very status as non-persons that allowed them to
occupy their role as unpaid and often unacknowledged servitors.
In the Slave Descendants case, we are informed that slaves were, first
and foremost, items of personal property, both as a result of law and as a
result of widely held social understandings. In the beginning of his
discussion of the history of slavery, Judge Norgle tells the reader that
Europeans were drawn to Africa for two reasons: gold and slaves. 19 0 The
conjoining of gold and slaves, and the placement of slaves first in this
formulation, makes clear that slaves were thought of in quite neutral terms
as an asset similar to gold, a treasure that might be obtained not through the
fixed intent of the slave traders, but through serendipity.

188 HASlAN, supra note 1, at 141-42 (noting the historical value of Jim Conley's testimony, in
which, he became the first black man allowed to testify against a White man in a Southern court).
189 Id. at 142 (discussing the impact of Mr. Conley's ability to testify had on African Americans).
190 See In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 727 (N.D. Ill. 2005)
(examining the main reasons why Europeans were drawn to Africa).
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ii. Slave Traders as Characterizations
It is remarkable, given contemporary history's broad indictment of the
role played by European slave traders in creating and sustaining the slave
trade, that the judge in Slave Descendantsmanages to paint slave traders in
such a different light. To the court, they are hapless, and possibly even
blameless, individuals who traveled to Africa with a secondary motive of
finding slaves. Once there, Judge Norgle writes, slave traders "simply
kidnapped individuals who appeared before them by happenstance."'91 By
this account, stealing human beings to cast them into a life of bondage
often accompanied by physical abuse is treated as the venial act of
misguided individuals and not the horrific crime against humanity that it
was. Such an account, as one observer wrote when discussing widespread
and apparently sanctioned police violence against blacks and other racial
minorities, has the effect of localizing "systematic violence in order to
submerge the contradiction of unfreedom in the land of the free."1 92
Moreover, Judge Norgle hastens to implicate other Africans in the
American slave trade, writing that a "great deal," and "perhaps even the
majority," of the slave trade was made possible by "African leaders who
sold African slaves to European slave traders."' 19 3
This mention of the role of Africans in supporting the slave trade is
misleading and facile in that it fails to account for the complexities of
slavery and human captivity among Africans. First, a number of such
captives were prisoners taken in wars between ethnic groups. 194 Next,
while slavery was practiced in some parts of Africa, the institution often
took place under markedly different material and structural conditions than
were present in white dominated countries. For example, the domestic
household slavery sometimes practiced in some regions of Africa was in a
number of cases more akin to a master-servant relationship where the slave
might, for any number of reasons, ultimately become a member of the
master's household on par with other members.19 5 In addition, the historic
practice of domestic slavery in some parts of Africa was in many respects
similar to the prison system in many contemporary nations; it was a means
191 See id. (speaking of the European's practice of "kidnapping" Africans and sending them to the
slave trade).
192 Aimee Carrillo Rowe, Whose "America"? The Politicsof Rhetoric and Space in the Formation
of U.S. Nationalism, 89 RADICAL HIST. REV. 115, 116 (2004) (examining America and its ironic alias
"the land of thefree").
193 See Slave Descendents, 375 F.Supp. 2d at 727.
194 ANNE C. BAILEY, AFRICAN VOICES OF TuE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE: BEYOND THE SILENCE
AND THE SHAME 136, 157-60 (Beacon Press 2005).
195 Id. at 59.
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of ridding societies of transgressors.196 The harsher practices of domestic
slavery eventually seen in some -regions of Africa apparently evolved as
Africans frequently drew on customs they learned from how Europeans
practiced slavery. 197
Finally, even where Africans provided slaves to Europeans for
enslavement in Europe and the New World, placing the onus of slavery on
Africans alone is deeply reminiscent of the "supply side" rhetorical
mechanisms employed in fighting the contemporary "drug war" in the
West. 198 Frequently, Western politicians and media sources blame Latin
American or Asian growers of drug plants as well as a nebulous assortment
of other "cartels, traffickers, and dealers" for the scourge of drugs in
Western countries. 199 Moreover, the public rhetoric employed in the United
States frequently demands punishment for the supply-side actors while
supporting relatively benign sanctions such as treatment and recovery
options for middle and upper class demand-side drug users in the United
States. 200
As is the case with blaming off-shore drug suppliers for the United
States drug epidemic, Judge Norgle's blaming Africans themselves for the
enslavement of African-ancestored people ignores the fact that without a
virulent and apparently insatiable demand for slaves in Western countries,
there could be no slavery, just as without such high demand for drugs in the
2
West there could be no drug trade. 01
Starting in the early 1800s, as slavery took hold in the United States,
"slave fever," 202 or the fervent demand for black slaves, grew exponentially
196 Id.at 89.
197 Id. at 157-160 (exhibiting the harshness of domestic slavery through various firsthand
accounts).
198 EVA BERTRAM ET AL., DRUG WAR POLITICS: THE PRICE OF DENIAL 25 (Univ. of Cal. Press
1996) (proposing that the importance of preventing drug use in the U.S. is sometimes obscured by
rhetoric from public officials and the media).
199 Id. (explaining how U.S. policies in the war on drugs primarily have been focused on the
sources of illegal drugs instead of the substantial demand for them).
200 See id. (describing how public rhetoric at times obscures the war on drugs); see also A. BELDEN
FIELDS, RETHINKING HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 195 (Palgrave 2003) (stating that in
contrast to the leniency that is shown to middle income drug users, the penalties for lower income racial
outsider drug users are often harsh and unforgiving, considering; for example, the differential penalties
imposed on upper class, mostly white users of cocaine versus lower income, mostly racial minority
crack users in the United States).
201 See COMING TOGETHER?: MEXICO-U.S. RELATIONS 18 (Bosworth, et. al. eds., Brookings
Institution Press 1997) (distinguishing the American focus on Mexican suppliers of drugs in attempting
to eradicate U.S. drug problems from Mexico's focus on the persistent demand existent in the U.S. as
being a substantial cause of the problem).
202 GAYLE T. TATE & LEWIS A. RANDOLPH, "There is No Refuge in Conservatism": A Case Study
of Black Political Conservatism in Richmond, Virginia, in DIMENSIONS OF BLACK CONSERVATISM IN
THE UNITED STATES: MADE IN AMERICA 43 (Gayle T. Tate & Lewis A. Randolph eds., Palgrave
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as middle class whites attempted to achieve their dreams of wealth by
exploiting black labor. 203 Like junkies yearning for a fix, 204 slave owners
were ever in search of new sources of slaves, even after the Migration and
Importation Clause of the United States Constitution ostensibly barred
further imports from outside the United States. 205 It has been estimated, for
example, that at least 270,000 slaves were illegally brought into the United
States between 1808 and 1860.206
I now turn to a discussion of narratives and myths.
F. Narrativesand Myths in Slave Descendants: The Causes of the Civil
War
The term "narrative" describes a range of discursive practices, including
such diverse forms of communication as gossip and anecdote, novels and
short stories, television presentations and plays, and legal documents and
legal opinions. 207 A common thread or theme in the varying forms of
communication that may be described as narratives is the ordering of
events or experiences in a sequence. 208 While narratives establish the
relationship between and among things via plot, narratives do more than
relate events sequentially. 209 The plot transforms a sequence in a structure
Macmillan 2002) (explaining how southern middle class slaveholders depended on slaves to achieve
their goals).
203 See id. (acknowledging that great dependence on black labor fed large currents of slave
resistance).
204 See id. (noting that the term "junkie" has become sufficiently a part of everyday parlance in
North American English and in other variants of English that most readers will recognize that it is
synonymous with "addict;" similarly, most will recognize "fix" as a term describing a dose or infusion
of drugs); OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (Oxford Univ. Press 2009), http://www.oed.com
(explaining the term "jones". I have employed this metaphor in order to convey the almost pestilential
demand for slaves that had overtaken much of the American South in the period leading up to the Civil
War); see also TATE & RANDOLPH, supra note 203, at 43-44 (stating, as an example, that the Virginia
colony imported a substantial slave population in the early eighteenth century).
205 See U.S. CONST. art. I § 9, cl. I ("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year
one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not
exceeding ten dollars for each Person."); see also Lolita K. Buckner Inniss, Tricky Magic: Blacks As
Immigrants and the Paradox Of Foreignness, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 85, 90 (1999) ("Although the
Migration and Importation Clause did not explicitly mention slavery, the legislative history of the
clause is clear.")
206 VERNON M. BRIGGS JR., IMMIGRATION AND AMERICAN UNIONISM 12-13 (Cornell Univ. Press
2001) (discussing the amount of slaves illegally smuggled into the United States between 1808 and
1860).
207 WAYNE C. BOOTH, THE COMPANY WE KEEP: AN ETHICS OF FICTION, 14 (Univ. of Cal. Press
1988) (listing different types of narratives).
208 JASINSKI, supra note 46, at 390; ROBERT E SCHOLES, JAMES PHELAN & ROBERT KELLOGG,
THE NATURE OF NARRATIVE 207, 326 (Oxford Univ. Press 1966) (explaining that a narrative involves a
sequence).
209 JASINSKI, supra note 46, at 390.
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of actions. 2 10 Narratives, however, may in fact serve as the principal
paradigms for human communication. 2 11
Myths are related to narratives in that myths are master narratives
drawing on archetypal images that have implications sometimes well
beyond a specific community. 2 12 Myths are a way of explaining the world,
and may suggest mechanisms for resolving problems, reconciling
differences, or simply for accepting situations that may be to all
appearances impossible to change. Myths may be of many types, but have
been described by one commentator as generally fulfilling one of four
purposes. 2 13 Myths may be societal, offering instruction on how to live. 2 14
Myths may be the basis of identity claims, and may thereby offer members
of a particular group a basis for understanding who they are. 2 15 Myths may
also be eschatological, helping people to understand their future and what
life after death may entail. 2 16 Finally, myths may be cosmological, and in
this function may serve to explain the origins of a people and why and how
they came to exist. 2 17
For Hasian, writing in the specific context of critical legal rhetoric,
narratives are story forms with structured plots that help a people or society
organize the way in which they regard values and beliefs. 2 18 Narratives are
ways of speaking about events that are far more than forms of
representation. Myths are, according to Hasian, more enduring forms of
narratives, and have endured the test of time. Myths frequently involve
cross-cultural perspectives and ideas. In addressing narratives and myths in
the context of critical legal rhetoric, I will focus only on myth as the
broader and more expressive form of the narrative.
The Civil War is probably one of the most enduring myths of United
210 Id. ("Plot, then, is simply a structure of actions.").
211 DIDIER COSTE, NARRATIVE AS COMMUNICATION 4 (1989) (describing when narratives are
communication).
212 JASINSKI, supra note 46, at 383 ("Myths, in short, are narratives that report the struggles and
heroic exploits from a community's past; frequently, mythic stories drawn on archetypal images
(particular characters, events, etc.) that transcend the boundaries of a specific community.").
213

See RODERICK P. HART & SUZANNE M. DAUGHTON, MODERN RHETORICAL CRITICISM 243-51

(3rd ed. 2005) (describing various purposes for myths).
214 See JASINSKI, supra note 46, at 383-84 (detailing different myths that describe how various
societies live).
215 Id. ("Identity myths provide the members of a community with a story that serves as the basis
for their sense of who they are as a collectivity.").
216 Id. ("Societal myths offer instruction on 'the proper way to live (e.g., the story about George
Washington and the cherry tree, the novels of Horatio Alger).").
217 See id. at 383 ("Cosmological myths explain 'why we are here, where we came from, [and]
what our ancestors were like."').
218 See HASIAN, supra note 1, at 15 ("As story forms, narratives have structured plots, and they
help us organize the way we think about our values and beliefs.").
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States history. One of the long entrenched narratives that prevailed in
historical accounts until relatively recently concerned the causes of the civil
war and more importantly, the causes for the South's loss. In the decades
after the Civil War, white Southerners were chagrined by their crushing
defeat at the hands of the North. Reeling from the social and economic
upheaval caused by the end of slavery and the loss of slave-based
industries, some white Southerners created what has been called the myth
of the "Lost Cause." 2 19 This set of beliefs served to assuage the pain of
their defeat, to validate their actions in the decades immediately before the
war and during the war years, and to justify the enormous cost of life and
suffering that the South had paid in its effort to win independence.2 2 0 The
myth has been incorporated into the civic culture of generations of white
Southerners and has accordingly influenced many aspects of life in the
South and the interpretation of Civil War history.
The myth of the Lost Cause posits the notion that the Confederacy was
doomed from the start in its struggle against the superior might of the
Union, but its forces fought heroically against all odds for the cause of
states' rights. In this account, slavery was not an ultimate cause of war, but
rather a collateral cause, since its elimination would undermine the South's
autonomy and the state's rights that yielded that autonomy. 22 1 A corollary
to this myth is the belief that white soldiers, both Southern and Northern,
gave their lives in part for unworthy collateral beneficiaries: the blacks who
had been enslaved in the South.
To some extent, the judge in Slave Descendants adopts up this strain of
mythologizing, starting with the judge's alleged uncertainty about the
ultimate causes of the war. Judge Norgle begins by stating, "Historians
have long debated whether slavery was the single driving force behind the
regional tensions in the United States that eventually led to the Civil
War." 222 The judge explores some of the contrasting views and concludes:
The court does not claim objective knowledge of the ultimate
cause of the Civil War. Certainly, however, tensions marked by
the North's moral outrage at the institution of chattel slavery, and
the South's indignation at the North's promulgation of the
Personal Liberty Laws, contributed significantly to the advent of
219 ALAN T. NOLAN, The Anatomy of the Myth, in THE MYTH OF THE LOST CAUSE AND CIVIL WAR

HISTORY 12 (Gary W. Gallagher & Alan T. Nolan eds., Indiana Univ. Press 2000).
220 See id. at 13 ("Leaders of such a catastrophe must account for themselves. Justification is
necessary.").
221 See id. at 15 (mentioning the principle that slavery was not the cause of the secession).
222 In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 721, 729 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
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The immediate query in reading this section is why such a discussion is
relevant to the plaintiffs' claims for reparations. The reason becomes clear
as the judge in a subsequent section details the enormous loss of life
suffered by both the North and the South.224 These statements are relevant
to the memory of whether reparations were paid to blacks.
G. Memories
The relationship between memory and rhetoric dates back to rhetoric's
origins.2 25 Memory, or memoria, existed as the one of the five canons of
classical rhetoric, 226 which consisted also of: inventio (invention), the
227
process that leads to the development and refinement of an argument;
dispositio (disposition, or arrangement), 22 8 which is used to determine how
the argument, once developed, should be organized for maximum effect,
elocutio (style); 229 and pronuntiatio (presentation), 230 employed once the
speech content is known and the structure is determined. Memoria, or
memory, comes to play as the speaker recalls each of these elements during
the speech, and actio (delivery) 23 1 is the final step as the speech is
presented in a gracious and pleasing manner.
Memory is sometimes presented as a seemingly simplistic recalling of
either a past event or something previously said,2 32 and has been frequently
ignored in service to the other canons of rhetoric. 233 However, memory is
much more nuanced and complex. Exercises in memory, it has been said,
are less like a book and more akin to making up stories anew each time the
memory is accessed. 234 A memory of an event reflects a combination of
information obtained at the time an incident occurred, and inferences based
on knowledge, expectations, beliefs, and attitudes derived from other
223 Id.
224 Id. at 780-81 (detailing the impact of the war on the troops and their families).
225 See Mary J. Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture, in
CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL LITERATURE 104-05 (Mary J. Carruthers ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1990) (discussing Aristotle's concept of the relationship between logic and memory).
226 See CORBETT, supra note 34, at 22.
227 Id. at 22-23.
228 Id. at 20.
229 Id. at 26-27.
230 Id. at 28.
231 See CORBETT, supra note 34, at 28.
232 Carruthers, supra note 226, at 46-47.
233 Id. at 9-13.
234 FREDERIC C. BARTLETT, REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 202-04 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1995).
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sources. Memory is a rich and complex part of the pentad of rhetoric, and
contemporary studies of rhetoric have fully textualized and contextualized
memory discourse by dividing memory into several categories. Collective
memory, popular memory, cultural memory, and public memory are just
some of these. 235
Collective memory has been described as "what is remembered by the
dominant civic culture." 236 It is, while the sum of group project in memory,
ultimately a socially constructed notion.2 37 Collective memory is not, as
may be popularly assumed, a "mystical group mind;" rather, it draws
strength and coherence from the individuals comprising a particular
group. 238 Popular memory, a somewhat related term, often refers to the
memories of the common, everyday actors within a populace. 239 Popular
memory has been described as the "antithesis of written history" in that it
does not rely on fixed or determined facts, but instead seizes on "omens,
portents and signs." 2 4 0 Cultural memory reflects the particularized
worldview and ethos of a certain culture. 24 1
Public memory is related to cultural memory in that it is an amalgam of
the cultural memory of the ruling elite in any particular society and parts of
the cultural memory of cultures within that same society that are
appropriated by the ruling elite.2 4 2 While all of these categories of memory
may figure into legal decisions, in Slave Descendants, it is public memory
that looms largest, since, in the regime of law, public memory frequently
24 3
serves as a tool for motivating legal claims and justifying outcomes.
a. The Role of Public Memory in Making Law
Public memory is typically concerned with a collective sense of what to

235 FRANCES A. YATES, THE ART OF MEMORY (Univ. of Chi. Press 1966).
236 RICHARD JOSEPH MORRIS, SINNERS LOVERS AND HEROES: AN ESSAY ON MEMORIALIZING IN
THREE AMERICAN CULTURES 236 (State Univ. of N.Y. Press 1997).
237 MAURICE HALBWACHS, ON COLLECTIVE MEMORY 22 (Lewis A. Coser ed., Lewis A. Coser
trans., 1992).
238 Id..
239 See id. ("Social classes, families, associations, corporations, armies, and trade unions all have
distinctive memories that their members have constructed, often over long periods of time.").
240 RAPHAEL SAMUEL, THEATRES OF MEMORY: PAST AND PRESENT INCONTEMPORARY CULTURE
6 (Verso 1994).
241 See id. (discussing a number of historical events of culturally specific public memory).
242 See id. at16. (describing educational materials that select events from history).
243 See Joachim J. Savelsberg & Ryan D. King, Law and Collective Memory, 3 ANN. REV. L. SOC.
SCI. 189, 200 (2007) ("Memory of past injustice can influence our expectation of what constitutes
justice . .. . Memory can spur feelings of retribution, when law is called upon to dispense criminal
punishment."); id. at202 ("[S]ymbols of past evil can serve as analogical references that bolster calls
for legal (and other) intervention in conflict.").
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remember and how to remember it.244 Public memory is subject to the
"history, hierarchies, and aspirations" of a particular community, 24 5 and is
often a significant component in forging collective identities. 246 Public
memory is, at bottom, contested and contingent, 24 7 and the contest is
frequently between the "official culture"-that which exercises hegemony,
and the "vernacular culture"-unofficial, subsidiary cultures. 248 As one
scholar writes, "[m]emory is more likely to be activated by contestation,
and amnesia is more likely to be induced by the desire for
reconciliation." 249
One reason that public memory is often seen in the legal context is
because public memory lives only if it is given voice in some "expressive
form." 2 50 An act of memory achieves expressive form when it is performed
for others who receive it as an audience. 25 1 Because of the need for
expressive form, public memory relies upon the "agency of a text"--that is,
it relies upon some vehicle for transmission, such as speeches, letters, or
judicial opinions. 252 Public memory shapes ideas and ideals, and helps to
draw the parameters of social belonging. As one scholar has written, "[I]n
our efforts to make sense of the present, we search the past for material,
social, and political warrants that make the present what it is. In so doing,
we

re-collect and

re-member

pieces ...

that

serve

our particular

purposes." 2 53 Hence, an essential purpose of memory is to recall and
maintain tradition.

244 See PAUL CONNERTON, How SOCIETIES REMEMBER 3-4 (1989); JAMES FENTRESS & CHRIS
WICKHAM, SOCIAL MEMORY: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE PAST 20-35, 202 (1992) (commenting on

how and why traditions are remembered by groups); see generally JACQUES LE GOFF, HISTORY AND
MEMORY (Steven Rendall & Elizabeth Claman trans., 1992) (noting the links between what groups
remember in public memory and how it functions).
245 Stephen H. Browne, Reading, Rhetoric, and the Texture of Public Memory, 81 Q. J. OF SPEECH
237, 248 (1995).
246 See Stephen H. Browne, Remembering Crispus Attucks: Race, Rhetoric and The Politics Of
Commemoration, 85 Q. J. OF SPEECH 169, 185-86 (1999) (positing questions about the function and
workings of public memory where collective identity exists in tension with cultural norms).
247 See MICHAEL KAMMEN, MYSTIC CHORDS OF MEMORY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF TRADITION
IN AMERICAN CULTURE 13 (Alfred A. Knopf 1991) (arguing for an explanation of why memory is "so
often contested" by normative culture).
248 JOHN BODNAR, REMAKING AMERICA: PUBLIC MEMORY, COMMEMORATION, AND PATRIOTISM

IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 14-16 (Princeton Univ. Press 1992).
249 KAMMEN, supra note 248, at 13.
250 Browne, Reading, supra note 246, at 248.
251 Id. ("[P]ublic memory lives as it is given expressive form.").
252 EDWARD S. CASEY, REMEMBERING: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL STUDY 217-18 (2nd ed. 2000).
253 See DEXTER B. GORDON, BLACK IDENTITY: RHETORIC, IDEOLOGY AND NINETEENTH-CENTURY

BLACK NATIONALISM 4-5 (S. Ill. Univ. Press 2003) (discussing how people interpret historical facts for
various purposes).
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b. Tradition as the Core of Public Memory
Tradition is often at the heart of public memory. Tradition is dual in
nature; it refers to the narratives or customs that are passed down, as well
as to the process by which the narratives or customs are handed down. 254
Traditions are, in most cases, received and not invented, notwithstanding
the assertions of some scholars. 25 5 Therefore, tradition forms the core of
public memory, and is too often viewed as unchanging.
This static view of public memory is particularly problematic for critical
legal rhetoricians, for while memory is a vehicle for tradition, it is also
nonlinear and is a structure that is fabricated and gains and loses value over
time. 256 Tradition is thus a rather imperfect deity, one standing with feet of
clay, as it is too much subject to the whims of time. Because of these
limits, tradition-centered public memory may easily degrade into an
unreasoning and unreasonable master that dictates our actions. Tradition in
such case is, as Nietzsche writes, a higher power that human beings obey,
not because it commands what is useful to us, but because it commands. 257
c. Public Memory and Reparations in the Slave Descendants Case
Much of the public memory that asserts itself as tradition-based is
contested, so much so that, in some cases, what asserts itself as part of the
public memory seems more exemplary of amnesia and often stands in stark
relief to the counter memories of the disenfranchised. 258 One of the public
254 See JOHN BODNAR, REMAKING AMERICA: PUBLIC MEMORY, COMMEMORATION, AND
PATRIOTISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 17 (Princeton Univ. Press 1993) (providing an example of
how the legacy of the pioneers has been handed down).
255 Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in THE INVENTION OF TRADITION 1-14
(Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1983) ("'Traditions' which appear or
claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented.").
256 HASIAN, supra note 1, at 29 ("Critical legal rhetoricians would ... try to replace linear ways of
looking at both histories and memories with analyses that see these structures as fabrications that are
constantly gaining and losing their rhetoricity.").
257 FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE, THE NIETZSCHE READER 87 (Keith Ansell Pearson &
Duncan Large eds., 2006).
258 See Mary Mason Williams, The Civil War Centennial and Public Memory in Virginia (Univ. of
Va. 2005), http://www2.vcdh.virginia.edu/civilrightstv/essays/williams.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2009)
("Often the historical facts and public memory of events diverge, revealing a desire of Americans to
warp the true events of the past into a sentimentalized and idealistic version of the past."); see also
DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY I (Belknap Press
2001) ("'When one is happy in forgetfulness, facts get forgotten."') (quoting ROBERT PENN WARREN,
LEGACY OF THE CIVIL WAR (1961)); GEORGE LIPSITZ, TIME PASSAGES: COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND
AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE 212 (Univ. of Minn. Press 1990) ("[S]ocially created divisions appear
natural and inevitable unless we can tell stories that illustrate the possibility of overcoming unjust
divisions."); Peter McLaren & Tomaz Tadeu Da Silva, Decentering Pedagogy: Critical Literacy,
Resistance and the Politics of Memory, in PAULO FREIRE: A CRITICAL ENCOUNTER, 47, 73-77 (Peter
McLaren & Peter Leonard eds., 2001) (1993) ("[O]ne has to acknowledge that there may be some
meanings repressed by the narrative structure.").
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memories in contest here, and in many ways essential to the plaintiffs'
claim, is whether reparations were already paid to African-ancestored
persons in the United States.
Although not explicitly in question, the judge seems to raise the matter
of whether reparations were paid to African-Americans sua sponte, or on
the court's own initiative, and as obiter dictum, as a passing comment that
has no direct bearing and yet has significant negative implications for the
plaintiffs' case. The use of obiter dictum to answer questions going beyond
the claims of the plaintiff in order to suggest that the plaintiffs' claims for
reparation are completely unfounded calls to mind another judicial use of
obiter dictum in the context of slavery: Justice Roger Taney's declarations
in Dred Scott v. Sandford259 that the Missouri Compromise, which, among
other things, barred slavery in some states, was unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION

In this article I discuss the nature of critical legal rhetoric and show how
it is a useful tool for uncovering the distinct ideological leanings that may
be deployed to affect a systematic, articulable language-based subject
positioning of the African-ancestored persons in Slave Descendants. Such
a project is, of course, subject to the critique that its outcome may be highly
dependent on the methodology selected for performing a language based
analysis. This is especially true given the fact that critical legal rhetoric is a
relatively recent development in the much broader field of critical
discourse analysis. Critical legal rhetoric, like critical discourse analysis,
concerns itself with the way in which language is deployed ideologically in
texts. However, there are clear distinctions to be made between the two.
Genres of rhetorical criticism such as critical legal rhetoric typically
consider the mechanisms that texts employ to frame meaning, and the ways
in which, and/or the extent to which, such meaning creates understanding
and promotes identification between rhetoric and audience. 260 Discourse,
by contrast, focuses on the interplay of texts (intertextuality) and discourses
(interdiscursivity) in order to illuminate the nature of socio-political
struggle and show the relationship between texts and macro-sociological
issues. In short, critical legal rhetoric is about how language functions in
law to produce and sustain power and legitimacy in the context of what is
259 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 455 (1857) (declaring the Missouri Compromise
unconstitutional).
260 Sharon Livesey, Global Warming Wars: Rhetorical and Discourse Analytic Approaches to
Exxonmobil's CorporatePublic Discourse39 J. BUS. COMM. 117, 117 (2002).
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very clearly an active rhetorical culture. 26 1 As such, it becomes a potent
tool.

261 Lucaites, supra note 13, at 446.

